(132a:1)בעי רבא בבריא היאך בשכ"מ הוא דניחא ליה דלישתמעון מלה אבל בבריא הא קאי איהו או דלמא בריא נמי ניחא ליה דלישתמעון מלה מהשתא
(132a:1)With regard to the halakha that a person on his deathbed who wrote a document granting all his property to his wife has appointed her as a steward, Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a healthy person, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that specifically in the case of a person on his deathbed it is assumed that he intended to appoint his wife as a steward, as it is preferable for him that her word be heard and she is honored after his death, but in the case of a healthy person, he is still standing and can ensure that his wife is honored, so he apparently intended to actually give her all of his property? Or perhaps should it be reasoned that in the case of a healthy person as well, it is preferable that his wife’s word be heard and she be given honor from now?
(132a:2)תא שמע הכותב פירות נכסיו לאשתו גובה כתובתה מן הקרקע למחצה לשליש ולרביע גובה כתובתה מן השאר
(132a:2)The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from a baraita: If one writes a document that the profits of his property should go to his wife in the event that he dies or divorces her, she collects payment of her marriage contract, which he wrote her at the time of their marriage, from the land itself. The profits are hers as a result of his gift. Similarly, if he wrote a document granting her one-half, one-third, or one-quarter of his property, she collects payment of her marriage contract from the rest of his property, which he did not give her as a separate gift.
(132a:3)כתב כל נכסיו לאשתו ויצא עליו שטר חוב רבי אליעזר אומר תקרע מתנתה ותעמוד על כתובתה וחכ"א תקרע כתובתה ותעמוד על מתנתה ונמצאת קרחת מכאן ומכאן
(132a:3)The baraita continues: If one wrote a document granting all his property to his wife, and subsequently a promissory note emerged against him for a loan he took while they were married but before he gave her this gift, Rabbi Eliezer says that she should tear up her deed of gift and remain with her marriage contract, so that the creditor will not be able to collect the property she received, as her marriage contract preceded the promissory note. And the Rabbis say: She must tear up her marriage contract and remain with her deed of gift, as by accepting the gift of all her husband’s property she waived her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. Since the promissory note preceded the deed of gift, the creditor receives the property, and the wife is found to be bald from here and from there, i.e., she receives neither her gift nor her marriage contract.
(132a:4)ואמר רבי יהודה הנחתום מעשה ואירע הדבר בבת אחותי כלה ובא מעשה לפני חכמים ואמרו תקרע כתובתה ותעמוד על מתנתה ונמצאת קרחת מכאן ומכאן
(132a:4)And Rabbi Yehuda the baker said: There was an incident where this matter occurred to my sister’s daughter who is my daughter-in-law [kalla], that my son wrote such a document to her, and the incident came before the Sages. And they said that she must tear up her marriage contract and remain with her deed of gift, and she is found to be bald from here and from there.
(132a:5)טעמא דיצא עליו שטר חוב הא לא יצא עליו שטר חוב קניא ובמאי אילימא בשכ"מ והא אמרת לא עשאה אלא אפוטרופוס אלא לאו בבריא
(132a:5)The Gemara infers: The reason she loses her gift is that a promissory note emerged against him, but if a promissory note did not emerge against him, she acquires the gift of his property. And with regard to what case is this stated? If we say it is with regard to a person on his deathbed, but didn’t you say previously that in such a case he merely rendered her a steward? Rather, is it not with regard to a healthy person? Accordingly, Rava’s dilemma is resolved: If a healthy person writes a document granting all his property to his wife, it is hers.
(132a:6)לעולם בשכיב מרע ורב עוירא מוקי לה בכולהו רבינא מוקי לה באשתו ארוסה ואשתו גרושה
(132a:6)The Gemara rejects this proof: Actually, the halakha of the baraita is stated with regard to a person on his deathbed; and Rav Avira would interpret the baraita as referring to all of the cases mentioned above in which, in his opinion, the wife acquires the property and is not appointed as a steward. And Ravina would interpret it specifically in reference to a case where one wrote a document granting all his property to his betrothed wife or his former wife, whom he divorced, where he concedes that she acquires the property.
(132a:7)אמר רב יוסף בר מניומי אמר רב נחמן הלכה תקרע כתובתה ותעמוד על מתנתה ונמצאת קרחת מכאן ומכאן
(132a:7)Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Naḥman says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. She must tear up her marriage contract and remain with her deed of gift, and she is found to be bald from here and from there.
(132a:8)למימרא דלא אזיל רב נחמן בתר אומדנא
(132a:8)The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rav Naḥman does not follow the principle of assessing intention, meaning that even if one did not state something explicitly, the court assesses what his intention was and decides the halakha based on that assessment? Clearly, upon accepting the gift the wife did not intend to waive payment of her marriage contract and thereby be left with nothing in the event that her husband’s creditor produces a promissory note that predates her gift.
(132a:9)והתניא הרי שהלך בנו למדינת הים ושמע שמת בנו ועמד וכתב כל נכסיו לאחרים ואחר כך בא בנו מתנתו מתנה ר' שמעון בן מנסיא אומר אין מתנתו מתנה שאילו היה יודע שבנו קיים לא כתבן ואמר רב נחמן הלכה כרבי שמעון בן מנסיא
(132a:9)But isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Ketubot 5:9): In a case where one’s son went overseas and he heard that his son died, and then he arose and wrote a document granting all his property to others, and then his son came back, his gift to the other people is a valid gift. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: His gift is not a valid gift, as had he known that his son was alive he would not have written a document granting them his property. And Rav Naḥman says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya. Apparently, Rav Naḥman follows the principle of assessing intention.
(132a:10)שאני התם דניחא לה דתיפוק עלה קלא דכתבינהו ניהלה להנהו נכסים
(132a:10)The Gemara answers: There, in the case of one who writes a document granting all his property to his wife, it is different, as it is beneficial to her that it be publicized that he wrote a document granting her all of that property, and she was willing to risk not receiving payment of her marriage contract to gain this benefit.
(132a:11)תנן התם הכותב נכסיו לבניו וכתב לאשתו קרקע כל שהוא אבדה כתובתה משום דכתב לה קרקע כל שהוא אבדה כתובתה
(132a:11)§ We learned in a mishna there (Pe’a 3:7): If a man writes a document granting his property to his sons, and he wrote a document granting any amount of land to his wife, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara questions this: Because he wrote a document granting her any amount of land, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract? Why should this be?
(132a:12)אמר רב במזכה להן על ידה ושמואל אמר במחלק לפניה והיא שותקת רבי יוסי בר' חנינא אמר באומר לה טלי קרקע זו בכתובתיך
(132a:12)Rav says: This mishna is referring to a case where the husband transfers ownership of his property to his sons through his wife’s participation in a formal act of acquisition. Not only did she not protest the transfer of property to the sons, but she facilitated the transaction. Clearly, she agreed to waive payment of her marriage contract. And Shmuel says: It is referring not only to a case where she actually participates in the act of acquisition, but also to a case where he distributes the property to his sons in her presence, and she is silent and does not ask about her marriage contract. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: It is referring to a case where he says to her: Take only this parcel of land for your marriage contract.
(132b:1)ומקולי כתובה שנו כאן
(132b:1)And the Sages taught here one of the leniencies that apply to a marriage contract. This manner in which the wife loses her right to receive payment of her marriage contract is a leniency for the husband, as an ordinary creditor does not lose money he is owed in this fashion.
(132b:2)תנן ר' יוסי אומר אם קבלה עליה אע"פ שלא כתב לה אבדה כתובתה מכלל דת"ק סבר כתיבה וקבלה בעי
(132b:2)The Gemara questions this statement: We learned in the same mishna that Rabbi Yosei says that if she accepted the distribution upon herself, even if he did not write a document granting her any amount of land, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. By inference, it can be stated that the first tanna holds that both his writing a document granting her a piece of land and her acceptance of the distribution are necessary for her to lose her right, contrary to the interpretation of all three amora’im, i.e., Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, all of whom assumed that she need not affirmatively accept the distribution and that her silence is sufficient.
(132b:3)וכי תימא כולה ר' יוסי היא והא תניא אמר רבי יהודה אימתי שהיתה שם וקבלה עליה אבל היתה שם ולא קבלה עליה קבלה עליה ולא היתה שם לא אבדה כתובתה תיובתא דכולהו תיובתא
(132b:3)And if you would say that the entire mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that either the husband’s writing a deed of gift or the wife’s acceptance of the distribution is sufficient, but isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: According to the first tanna, when does she lose her right to receive payment of her marriage contract? In a case where she was there at the time of the distribution and accepted it; but if she was there but did not accept it, or accepted it but was not there, she has not lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract, as she can claim that her acquiescence was only to please her husband and was not sincere. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinions of all the interpretations of the amora’im is indeed a conclusive refutation.
(132b:4)אמר ליה רבא לרב נחמן הא רב הא שמואל הא ר' יוסי בר' חנינא מר מאי סבירא ליה א"ל שאני אומר כיון שעשאה שותף בין הבנים אבדה כתובתה
(132b:4)Rava said to Rav Naḥman: This is the opinion of Rav; this is the opinion of Shmuel; and this is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. What does the Master hold in this matter? Rav Naḥman said to him: As I say, that once he rendered her a partner in the property among the sons, she lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.
(132b:5)איתמר נמי אמר רב יוסף בר מניומי אמר רב נחמן כיון שעשאה שותף בין הבנים אבדה כתובתה
(132b:5)Rav Naḥman’s opinion was also stated as a halakhic ruling: Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Naḥman says that once he rendered her a partner in the property among the sons, she lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.
(132b:6)בעי רבא בבריא היאך מי אמרינן בשכיב מרע הוא דידעה דלית ליה וקמחלה אבל בבריא סברה הדר קני או דלמא השתא מיהת לית ליה תיקו
(132b:6)Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a healthy person, what is the halakha? Do we say that the wife loses her right to receive payment of her marriage contract only in the case of a person on his deathbed, as she knew that he had no other property and nevertheless waived payment of the marriage contract, but in the case of a healthy person, she might have reasoned that he will then acquire other property from which she will be able to collect payment of her marriage contract, and that is why she accepted the distribution of the property? If so, she did not waive her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. Or perhaps, should it be reasoned that since in any event, now he has no other property, her acceptance should be interpreted as waiving her right? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
(132b:7)ההוא דאמר להו פלגא לברת ופלגא לברת ותילתא לאיתת בפירי איקלע רב נחמן לסורא עול לגבי רב חסדא אמר ליה כי האי גוונא מאי אמר ליה הכי אמר שמואל אפילו לא הקנה לה אלא דקל אחד לפירותיו אבדה כתובתה
(132b:7)§ There was a certain man on his deathbed who said to the people surrounding him: Give one-half of my estate to my daughter, and one-half to my other daughter, and one-third of the produce to my wife. Rav Naḥman happened to come to Sura. He entered the study hall to see Rav Ḥisda, who said to him: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him that this is what Shmuel says: Even if he transferred to her ownership only one palm tree for its produce, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.
(132b:8)אמר ליה אימור דאמר שמואל התם דאקני לה בגופה דארעא הכא פירא הוא אמר ליה מטלטלי קא אמרת מטלטלי ודאי לא קא אמינא
(132b:8)Rav Ḥisda said to him: Say that Shmuel said his statement that she loses her right there, in a case where he gave her a palm tree for its produce, because he transferred rights in the land itself to her ownership, as the palm tree is connected to the ground. But here, in this case, it is only produce that he gave her, without any share in the land itself. Perhaps she does not lose payment of her marriage contract. Rav Naḥman said to him: You say that he gave her only movable property? I certainly did not mean to say that she loses her right even if he gave her only movable property such as produce. Rather, she receives payment of her marriage contract.
(132b:9)ההוא דאמר להו תלתא לברת ותלתא לברת ותלתא לאיתת שכיבא חדא מבנתיה סבר רב פפי למימר לא שקלא אלא תלתא
(132b:9)There was a certain man on his deathbed who said to the people surrounding him: Give one-third of my property to my daughter, and one-third to my other daughter, and one-third to my wife. One of his daughters died before he did, and her portion consequently returned to his possession. Rav Pappi thought to say that the wife takes only one-third. She cannot receive payment of her marriage contract from the two-thirds bequeathed to the daughters, as by entering a partnership with the daughters in ownership of the property, she waived payment of her marriage contract.
