(134a:1)אם לאו אי אתה יכול להוציא מה שהחזרתי אמר הטיח עלי בן עוזיאל הטיח עלי בן עוזיאל
(134a:1)but if not, as the property is mine and I have the right to do with it whatever I want, you cannot repossess what I returned to the man’s children either. Shammai then said: Ben Uzziel reprimanded me; ben Uzziel reprimanded me, and I have no response.
(134a:2)מעיקרא מאי סבר משום מעשה דבית חורון
(134a:2)The Gemara asks: What did Shammai hold initially, causing him to protest Yonatan ben Uzziel’s behavior? The Gemara answers: He protested due to the incident that happened in the city of Beit Ḥoron.
(134a:3)דתנן מעשה בבית חורון באחד שהיה אביו מודר הימנו הנאה והיה משיא בנו ואמר לחבירו הרי חצר וסעודה נתונין לך במתנה ואינן לפניך [אלא כדי] שיבא אבא ויאכל עמנו בסעודה
(134a:3)As we learned in a mishna (Nedarim 48a): An incident occurred involving someone in the city of Beit Ḥoron whose father had vowed not to derive benefit from him, and the son was marrying off his own son and wanted his father to be able to participate in the wedding meal. And he therefore said to another: The courtyard where the wedding will take place and the wedding meal are hereby given to you as a gift, but they are given to you only so that my father will come and eat with us at the meal. The son wanted to circumvent the prohibition imposed by the vow and enable his father to participate in the meal, so he transferred ownership to someone else for that purpose.
(134a:4)אמר לו אם שלי הן הרי הן מוקדשין לשמים אמר לו לא נתתי לך את שלי שתקדישם לשמים אמר לו לא נתת לי את שלך אלא שתהא אתה ואביך אוכלין ושותין ומרצין זה לזה ויהא עון תלוי בראשו
(134a:4)The recipient said to him: If they are mine, they are all hereby consecrated to Heaven, i.e., the Temple, and are forbidden to everyone. The son said to him in anger: I did not give you my property so that you should consecrate them to Heaven. The recipient said to him: You gave me your property only so that you and your father would eat and drink and thereby appease each other, and the sin of transgressing the vow would be hung on his, i.e., my, head, as I enabled the transgression.
(134a:5)אמרו חכמים כל מתנה שאינה שאם הקדישה מוקדשת אינה מתנה:
(134a:5)The mishna continues: In reference to this incident, the Sages said: Any gift that is not so absolute that if the recipient were to consecrate it, the gift would be consecrated, is not a gift. In other words, in order for it to be a gift the recipient must have the ability to consecrate it. Similarly, Shammai had initially reasoned that the gift to Yonatan ben Uzziel was not a valid gift, as its sole purpose was so that the property should not fall into the possession of the man’s children. Once he discovered that Yonatan ben Uzziel consecrated part of the gift, he realized that it was, in fact, a valid gift, with which the recipient could do whatever he pleased.
(134a:6)תנו רבנן שמונים תלמידים היו לו להלל הזקן שלשים מהן ראוים שתשרה עליהן שכינה כמשה רבינו שלשים מהן ראוים שתעמוד להן חמה כיהושע בן נון עשרים בינוניים גדול שבכולן יונתן בן עוזיאל קטן שבכולן רבן יוחנן בן זכאי
(134a:6)§ Apropos Yonatan ben Uzziel, the Gemara cites that the Sages taught: Hillel the Elder had eighty students. Thirty of them were sufficiently worthy that the Divine Presence should rest upon them as it did upon Moses our teacher, thirty of them were sufficiently worthy that the sun should stand still for them as it did for Joshua bin Nun, and twenty were on an intermediate level between the other two. The greatest of all the students was Yonatan ben Uzziel, and the least of them was Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai.
(134a:7)אמרו עליו על רבן יוחנן בן זכאי שלא הניח מקרא ומשנה גמרא הלכות ואגדות דקדוקי תורה ודקדוקי סופרים וקלין וחמורין וגזרות שוות ותקופות וגמטריאות ומשלות כובסים ומשלות שועלים שיחת שדים ושיחת דקלים ושיחת מלאכי השרת ודבר גדול ודבר קטן
(134a:7)The Sages said about Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai that he did not neglect Bible and Mishna; Talmud; halakhot and aggadot; minutiae of the Torah and minutiae of the scribes; and the hermeneutical principles of the Torah with regard to a fortiori inferences; and verbal analogies; and the calculation of the calendric seasons; and numerical values of Hebrew letters [gimatriyot]; and parables of launderers, which are folktales that can be used to explain the Torah, and parables of foxes. In addition, he did not neglect esoteric matters, including the conversation of demons, and the conversation of palm trees, and the conversation of ministering angels, and more generally, a great matter and a small matter.
(134a:8)דבר גדול מעשה מרכבה ודבר קטן הויות דאביי ורבא לקיים מה שנאמר (משלי ח, כא) להנחיל אוהבי יש ואוצרותיהם אמלא
(134a:8)The Gemara elaborates: A great matter is referring to the secrets of the Design of the Divine Chariot (see Ezekiel, chapter 1), the conduct of the transcendent universe, and a small matter is, for example, halakhot that were ultimately formulated in the framework of the discussions of Abaye and Rava. He did not neglect any of these disciplines, so as to fulfill that which is stated: “That I may cause those that love me to inherit substance and that I may fill their treasuries” (Proverbs 8:21), as Rabban Yoḥanan was filled with the disciplines of Torah and wisdom.
(134a:9)וכי מאחר דקטן שבכולם כן גדול שבכולם על אחת כמה וכמה אמרו עליו על יונתן בן עוזיאל בשעה שיושב ועוסק בתורה כל עוף שפורח עליו נשרף:
(134a:9)The Gemara adds: And if the least of them was so prolific, the greatest of them was all the more so prolific. The Gemara relates that the Sages said of Yonatan ben Uzziel, the greatest of Hillel’s students, that when he would sit and engage in Torah study, the sanctity that he generated was so intense that any bird that would fly over him would be incinerated.
(134a:10)מתני׳ האומר זה בני נאמן זה אחי אינו נאמן ויטול עמו בחלקו
(134a:10)MISHNA: One who says: This is my son, is deemed credible. One who says: This is my brother, is not deemed credible with regard to his other brothers’ obligation to share the inheritance with the subject of his statement. When one claims that this man is his brother, this claim is accepted with regard to the speaker’s own portion, and the man in question takes a share of their father’s inheritance with him, i.e., from his portion.
(134a:11)מת יחזרו נכסים למקומן
(134a:11)If the man in question dies, the property he received from the father’s inheritance shall return to its place, i.e., to the possession of the brother who testified on his behalf, from whose portion he received a share.
(134a:12)נפלו לו נכסים ממקום אחר יירשו אחיו עמו:
(134a:12)If property came into the man in question’s possession from somewhere else, other than from the father, and the man in question died, all of the brothers of the one who testified shall inherit with the one who testified, as according to his claim they too are the heirs of the deceased.
(134a:13)גמ׳ זה בני נאמן למאי הלכתא אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל ליורשו ולפטור את אשתו מן היבום
(134a:13)GEMARA: The mishna teaches that one who says: This is my son, is deemed credible. With regard to what halakha is this stated? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: It is stated with regard to inheriting from him, i.e., the son inherits from the speaker, and with regard to rendering his wife exempt from levirate marriage. Because he claims that the person in question is his son, his wife is not required to enter into levirate marriage after his death, as he has a child.
(134b:1)ליורשו פשיטא לפטור את אשתו מן היבום אצטריכא ליה
(134b:1)The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that his claim is deemed credible with regard to someone inheriting from him? Since he could have given this person his property as a gift, it need not be stated that his claim is accepted with regard to his inheritance. The Gemara responds: It was necessary for the mishna to state that his claim is deemed credible with regard to rendering his wife exempt from levirate marriage despite the fact that it is not in his power to render her exempt, but the halakha of inheritance is not a novelty.
(134b:2)הא נמי תנינא מי שאמר בשעת מיתתו יש לי בנים נאמן יש לי אחים אינו נאמן
(134b:2)The Gemara asks: We already learned this in a mishna (Kiddushin 64a) as well: One who said at the time of his death: I have children, is deemed credible, and his wife is thereby exempt from levirate marriage. If he said: I have brothers, and his wife therefore must enter levirate marriage, he is not deemed credible.
(134b:3)התם דלא מוחזק לן באח הכא אף על גב דמוחזק ליה באח
(134b:3)The Gemara answers: There, in that mishna, it is a case where he is not presumed by us to have a brother. Therefore, his wife is already presumed to be exempt from levirate marriage, and his claim that he has a son merely substantiates this presumption. Here, the mishna adds a novelty that even if he is presumed to have a brother, his claim that he has a son is accepted, and his wife is thereby exempted from levirate marriage.
(134b:4)אמר רב יוסף אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל מפני מה אמרו זה בני נאמן הואיל ובעל שאמר גרשתי את אשתי נאמן
(134b:4)Rav Yosef says that Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: For what reason did the Sages say that one who says: This is my son, is deemed credible? Since a husband who says: I divorced my wife, is deemed credible, and his wife is thereby exempt from levirate marriage, he is deemed credible with regard to this claim as well.
(134b:5)א"ר יוסף מריה דאברהם תלי תניא בדלא תניא
(134b:5)As Rav Yosef forgot some of his Torah knowledge due to an illness, he questioned the accuracy of his citation of Rav Yehuda. Rav Yosef said: Master of Abraham! This reasoning makes that which is taught in the Mishna dependent upon that which is not taught, as the credibility of one who claims: This is my son, is stated in the mishna, while the halakha that a husband’s claim that he divorced his wife is accepted is the statement of an amora.
(134b:6)אלא אי אתמר הכי איתמר א"ר יהודה אמר שמואל מפני מה אמרו זה בני נאמן הואיל ובידו לגרשה
(134b:6)Rather, if this explanation was stated, it was stated like this: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: For what reason did the Sages say that one who says: This is my son, is deemed credible with regard to rendering his wife exempt from levirate marriage? Since it is in his power to divorce her and thereby render her exempt from levirate marriage, he is deemed credible with regard to this claim as well.
(134b:7)אמר רב יוסף השתא דאמרת אמרינן הואיל בעל שאמר גרשתי את אשתי נאמן הואיל ובידו לגרשה
(134b:7)Rav Yosef said in addition: Now that you said that we say that the husband is deemed credible since he has the power to divorce her, a husband who says: I divorced my wife, is also deemed credible, since it is in his power to divorce her at any time.
(134b:8)כי אתא רב יצחק בר יוסף אמר רבי יוחנן בעל שאמר גרשתי את אשתי אינו נאמן מנפח רב ששת בידיה אזל ליה הואיל דרב יוסף
(134b:8)When Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A husband who says: I have divorced my wife, is not deemed credible. Rav Sheshet waved his hand disparagingly, as if to say that Rav Yosef’s statement that he is deemed credible since it is in his power to divorce her is gone due to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement.
(134b:9)איני והא א"ר חייא בר אבין אמר רבי יוחנן בעל שאמר גרשתי את אשתי נאמן
(134b:9)The Gemara asks: Is that so? Did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say that? But doesn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A husband who says: I have divorced my wife, is deemed credible?
(134b:10)לא קשיא כאן למפרע
(134b:10)The Gemara answers: That is not difficult. Here, in the statement that the husband is not deemed credible, Rabbi Yoḥanan was referring to a retroactive testimony. For example, in a case where he testified that he divorced her on a certain date, and it is discovered that she engaged in sexual intercourse with another man after that date, his testimony is not accepted concerning whether the woman is liable to receive punishment; she is not considered to have been divorced at the time. This is because it is not in the husband’s power to divorce her retroactively.
(134b:11)כאן להבא
(134b:11)By contrast, the statement there, where Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the husband’s testimony is deemed credible, refers to testimony for the future, e.g., where he says that he divorced her on that same day, or without specifying a date, in which case his statement is relevant only for the future. Since it was in his power to divorce her at that time, his testimony is deemed credible; if he dies, she is exempt from levirate marriage, and if she engages in sexual intercourse with another man, she is not considered to have committed adultery.
(134b:12)איבעיא להו אמר למפרע מהו להימוניה להבא
(134b:12)A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the husband said that he divorced his wife on a certain date, as a retroactive testimony, what is the halakha concerning his testimony being deemed credible and accepted with regard to the future, rendering her divorced from that time onward, despite the fact that his claim is not accepted with regard to the past?
(134b:13)מי פלגינן דבורא או לא פלגינן דבורא רב מארי ורב זביד חד אמר פלגינן וחד אמר לא פלגינן
(134b:13)The dilemma is based on the following fundamental question: Do we divide the husband’s statement, accepting that he divorced his wife inasmuch as she is considered divorced from that time onward, since it is in his power to divorce her now, even though his claim that he divorced her in the past is not accepted? Or do we not divide the statement, and say instead that his claim is rejected altogether, since his claim concerning the past cannot be accepted? Rav Mari and Rav Zevid engaged in a dispute with regard to this issue. One says that we divide the husband’s statement, and one says that we do not divide it.
(134b:14)מאי שנא מדרבא דאמר רבא איש פלוני בא על אשתי הוא ואחר מצטרפין להורגו להורגו ולא להורגה
(134b:14)The Gemara asks: In what way is this case different from Rava’s statement? As Rava says that if a man says: So-and-so engaged in sexual intercourse with my wife, the husband and another witness combine to kill him, i.e., to have him sentenced to death for adultery. The Gemara infers: He combines with another witness to kill him, but not to kill her. The wife is not sentenced to death based on this testimony, even if they testified that she engaged in sexual intercourse willingly, as a husband is disqualified from bearing witness concerning his wife. Evidently, the husband’s testimony is divided; his testimony concerning the man is accepted even though the testimony concerning his wife’s part in the same action is rejected.
(134b:15)בתרי גופי פלגינן בחד גופא לא פלגינן
(134b:15)The Gemara answers: With regard to two separate bodies we divide the statement. Therefore the husband’s testimony is accepted with regard to the man but rejected with regard to his wife. With regard to one body we do not divide it. That is why one Sage holds that a husband’s claim that he divorced his wife in the past cannot be divided, so that his claim that he divorced her would be accepted while his claim as to when he divorced her would be rejected.
