(32a:1)ורשב"ג סבר ערער תרי והאמר רבי יוחנן דברי הכל אין ערער פחות משנים
(32a:1)and Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel holds that an effective challenge requires two witnesses, one could then ask: But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: Everyone agrees that there is no effective challenge with fewer than two witnesses?
(32a:2)אלא ערער תרי והכא במאי עסקינן כגון דמחזקינן ליה באבוה דהאי דכהן הוא ונפק עליה קלא דבן גרושה ובן חלוצה הוא ואחתיניה ואתא עד אחד ואמר דכהן הוא ואסקיניה
(32a:2)Rather, the challenge was established by two witnesses. And with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where we presume with regard to the father of that man that he is a priest, and a rumor emerged about the son that he is the son of a priest and a divorced woman, or the son of a priest and a ḥalutza, and we downgraded him from the presumptive status of priesthood based on that rumor, and one witness came and said that the man in question is a priest of unflawed lineage, and we elevated him back to the priesthood, as one witness is sufficient to negate a rumor.
(32a:3)ואתו בי תרי ואמרי דבן גרושה וחלוצה הוא ואחתיניה ואתא עד אחד ואמר דכהן הוא ודכולי עלמא מצטרפין עדות
(32a:3)The Gemara continues the case: And then two witnesses came and said that he is the son of a divorced woman or the son of a ḥalutza, and we downgraded him from the priesthood based on their testimony. Then one witness came and said that he is a priest of unflawed lineage, resulting in two witnesses testifying that his lineage is unflawed, and two testifying that it is flawed. And everyone agrees that the testimony of the two single witnesses combine to produce testimony that he is a priest of unflawed lineage, and his presumptive status of priesthood should be restored.
(32a:4)The Gemara explains the dispute: And here it is with regard to concern about contempt of court that they disagree. Rabbi Elazar holds: Once we downgraded him from the presumptive status of priesthood based on the testimony of two witnesses, we do not then elevate him, as we are concerned about contempt of court, as a reversal in the court’s decision creates the impression that the court operates indecisively. And Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel holds: We downgraded him from the presumptive status of priesthood and we then elevate him, and we are not concerned about contempt of court. The primary concern is that the matter should be determined based on the relevant testimonies.
(32a:5)מתקיף לה רב אשי אי הכי מאי איריא חד אפילו בתרי נמי אלא אמר רב אשי דכולי עלמא לא חיישינן לזילותא דבי דינא והכא בלצרף עדות קא מיפלגי ובפלוגתא דהני תנאי
(32a:5)Rav Ashi objects to the analysis that they disagree with regard to concern about contempt of court: If so, why specifically is it necessary to establish the dispute in a case where first one witness testified as to his unflawed lineage, and then another testified later? The same would hold true even in a case where two witnesses testified together that he is unfit for the priesthood and the court downgraded him, and two witnesses testified together that he is fit for the priesthood and the court elevated him. The tanna’im would also disagree, as the same concern applies. Rather, Rav Ashi said: Everyone agrees that we are not concerned about contempt of court. And here, it is with regard to whether the court is able to combine the testimony of two single witnesses that they disagree, and it is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the following dispute between these tanna’im.
(32a:6)דתניא לעולם אין עדותן מצטרפת עד שיראו שניהן כאחד ר' יהושע בן קרחה אומר אפילו בזה אחר זה אין עדותן מתקיימת בבית דין עד שיעידו שניהם כאחד ר' נתן אומר שומעין דבריו של זה היום ולכשיבא חבירו למחר שומעין דבריו:
(32a:6)As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Sanhedrin 5:5): The testimony of individual witnesses never combines unless it is so that the two of them see the incident transpire together as one. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: Their testimony combines even in a case where they witnessed the event one after the other, but their testimony is established in court only if it is so that the two of them testify together as one. Rabbi Natan says: They are not required to testify together. Their testimony is combined even if the court hears the statement of this witness today and when the other witness arrives tomorrow the court hears his statement. Rabbi Elazar and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree in the dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis, whether the separate testimonies can be combined.
(32a:7)§ The Gemara relates an incident where two people disputed the ownership of land. There was a certain person who said to another: What do you want with this land of mine? The possessor said to him: I purchased it from you, and this is the bill of sale.
(32b:1)אמר ליה שטרא זייפא הוא גחין לחיש ליה לרבה אין שטרא זייפא הוא מיהו שטרא מעליא הוה לי ואירכס ואמינא אינקיט האי בידאי כל דהו
(32b:1)The first said to him in response: It is a forged bill of sale. The possessor leaned over and whispered to Rabba: Yes, it is a forged bill. But I had a proper bill of sale and it was lost, and I said to myself: I will hold this bill of sale in my possession, such as it is.
(32b:2)אמר רבה מה לו לשקר אי בעי אמר ליה שטרא מעליא הוא אמר ליה רב יוסף אמאי סמכת אהאי שטרא האי שטרא חספא בעלמא הוא
(32b:2)Rabba said: Why would he lie and state this claim? If he wants to lie, he can say to him that it is a proper bill of sale, and he would have been deemed credible and awarded the field. Rav Yosef said to Rabba: In the final analysis, on what are you relying to award him the land? On this bill of sale? This admittedly forged bill is merely a worthless shard, and cannot be used in court as evidence.
(32b:3)ההוא דאמר לחבריה הב לי מאה זוזי דמסיקנא בך והא שטרא א"ל שטרא זייפא הוא גחין לחיש ליה לרבה אין שטרא זייפא מיהו שטרא מעליא הוה לי ואירכס ואמינא אינקיט האי בידאי כל דהו
(32b:3)The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain person who said to another: Give me one hundred dinars that I am attempting to collect from you, and this is the promissory note that attests to the debt. The latter said to him in response: It is a forged promissory note. The first person leaned over and whispered to Rava: Yes, it is a forged promissory note. But I had a proper promissory note and it was lost, and I said to myself: I will hold this promissory note in my possession, such as it is.
(32b:4)אמר רבה מה לו לשקר אי בעי אמר ליה שטרא מעליא הוא א"ל רב יוסף אמאי קא סמכת אהאי שטרא האי שטרא חספא בעלמא הוא
(32b:4)Rabba said: Why would he lie and state this claim? If he wants to lie, he can say to him that it is a proper promissory note, and he will be deemed credible and awarded the money. Rav Yosef said to Rabba: In the final analysis, on what are you relying to award him the money? On this promissory note? This document is merely a shard, and cannot be used in court as evidence.
(32b:5)אמר רב אידי בר אבין הלכתא כוותיה דרבה בארעא והלכתא כוותיה דרב יוסף בזוזי הלכתא כרבה בארעא דהיכא דקיימא ארעא תיקום והלכתא כוותיה דרב יוסף בזוזי דהיכא דקיימי זוזי לוקמי:
(32b:5)The Gemara notes the final ruling in these two cases. Rav Idi bar Avin said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba with regard to land, and the possessor is awarded the land, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef with regard to money, and the one demanding payment is not awarded the money. He explains: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba with regard to land, as the court rules that the land should remain where it is, i.e., with the possessor. And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef with regard to money, as the court rules that the money should remain where it is, i.e., in the possession of the purported debtor.
(32b:6)ההוא ערבא דאמר ליה ללוה הב לי מאה זוזי דפרעתי למלוה עילוך והא שטרא אמר ליה לאו פרעתיך אמר לאו הדרת שקלתינהו מינאי
(32b:6)The Gemara relates: There was a certain guarantor who said to a debtor: Give me one hundred dinars for the money that I repaid the creditor on your behalf, and this is the document that I received from him when I repaid your debt. The debtor said to the guarantor: Is it not so that I repaid you? The guarantor said to the debtor: Yes, you did, but is it not so that you later took the money from me again?
(32b:7)שלחה רב אידי בר אבין לקמיה דאביי כי האי גוונא מאי שלח ליה אביי מאי תיבעי ליה הא איהו דאמר הלכתא כוותיה דרבה בארעא והלכתא כוותיה דרב יוסף בזוזי דהיכא דאוקמו זוזי לוקמו
(32b:7)Rav Idi bar Avin sent the following question before Abaye: What is the halakha in a case like this? Abaye sent him the following response: What does he, i.e., Rav Idi bar Avin, ask? Isn’t he the one who said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba with regard to land, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef with regard to money, as the court rules that the money should remain where it is? Based on his own ruling, the money should remain with the debtor.
(32b:8)The Gemara notes: And this matter applies only in a case where the guarantor says to the debtor: You later borrowed the money from me after you had repaid me. But if the guarantor said to the debtor: I returned to you the money that you had repaid me because of the fact that the coins were worn out or overly reddish, i.e., discolored, and would not be easily accepted as currency, then the lien of the document is still in effect. The debt to the guarantor had not actually been repaid, and the document is still in effect. In that case, the guarantor collects from the debtor.
(32b:9)רבא בר שרשום נפק עליה קלא דקא אכיל ארעא דיתמי א"ל אביי אימא לי איזי גופא דעובדא היכי הוה אמר ליה ארעא במשכונתא הוה נקיטנא מאבוהון דיתמי והוה לי
(32b:9)The Gemara relates: A rumor emerged concerning Rava bar Sharshom that he was profiting from land belonging to orphans. Abaye said to him: Tell me, my friend, concerning the incident itself, how is it that this rumor was generated? Rava bar Sharshom said to him: I was holding on to the land as collateral from the father of the orphans, and I had
