(86a:1)פירקן והכניסן לתוך ביתו פסק עד שלא מדד אין שניהן יכולין לחזור בהן מדד עד שלא פסק שניהן יכולין לחזור בהן ומדכליו דמוכר ברשות לוקח לא קנה כליו דלוקח נמי ברשות מוכר לא קנה
(86a:1)But in a case where he unloaded the merchandise from them and brought it into his house, if he fixed a price before he measured the merchandise, both parties are no longer able to renege on the sale. If he measured the merchandise before fixing a price, both of them are able to renege on the sale. The Gemara comments: And from the fact that the vessels of the seller when in the domain of the buyer do not effect acquisition of the merchandise for the seller, i.e., they do not prevent the buyer from acquiring the merchandise, one can derive that the vessels of the buyer in the domain of the seller do not effect acquisition of the merchandise on his behalf as well.
(86a:2)אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק בששפכן איקפד רבא מידי שפכן קתני פירקן קתני אלא אמר מר בר רב אשי במתאכלי דתומי
(86a:2)Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The merchandise was not placed in the domain of the buyer in vessels belonging to the seller. Rather, the baraita is referring to a case where he emptied the vessels onto the ground. Conversely, if the merchandise remains in the seller’s vessels, the buyer does not acquire it. Rava became angry with Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak at his rejection of Rava’s proof, and retorted: Does the baraita teach: He emptied them? No; it teaches: He unloaded them, i.e., he kept the goods in vessels belonging to the seller. Rather, Mar bar Rav Ashi says: This proof can be rejected by means of a different interpretation, as the halakha of the baraita does not refer to vessels full of goods but is stated with regard to bundles of garlic that were tied together. Therefore, they are unloaded straight onto the floor in the buyer’s domain.
(86a:3)א"ל הונא בריה דמר זוטרא לרבינא מכדי פירקן קתני מה לי פסק ומה לי לא פסק א"ל פסק סמכא דעתיה לא פסק לא סמכא דעתיה
(86a:3)With regard to the matter itself, Huna, son of Mar Zutra, said to Ravina: Since the baraita teaches: He unloaded them, which indicates that unloading the merchandise constitutes the act of acquisition, what difference is there to me if he fixed a price, and what difference is there to me if he did not fix a price? Ravina said to him: If he fixed a price he has made up his mind to sell, and therefore the transaction can take place. If he did not fix a price, he has not made up his mind to sell and the transaction does not occur. In any event, no convincing proof has been found with regard to the halakha in a case where the vessels of the buyer are in the domain of the seller.
(86a:4)א"ל רבינא לרב אשי ת"ש דרב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו כליו של אדם קונה לו בכל מקום לאתויי מאי לאו לאתויי רשות מוכר התם דא"ל זיל קני
(86a:4)Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear a resolution, as Rav and Shmuel both say: A person’s vessel effects acquisition for him of any item placed inside it, in any place that it is situated. What is added by the phrase: In any place? Does it not serve to add the domain of the seller? Rav Ashi answered: There, it is referring to a specific case, where the seller said to him: Go and acquire it. In that situation, the buyer does acquire the merchandise. This does not refer to a standard case where the buyer’s vessels are located in the domain of the seller.
(86a:5)תנן התם נכסים שיש להן אחריות נקנין בכסף ובשטר ובחזקה ושאין להן אחריות אין נקנין אלא במשיכה בסורא מתנו לה להא שמעתא משמיה דרב חסדא בפומבדיתא מתנו לה משמיה דרב כהנא ואמרי לה משמיה דרבא לא שנו אלא דברים שאין דרכן להגביה אבל דברים שדרכן להגביה בהגבהה אין במשיכה לא
(86a:5)§ We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Kiddushin 26a): Property that is guaranteed, i.e., land, is acquired by means of money, or by means of a bill, or by taking possession of it. And property that does not have a guarantee, i.e., movable property, can be acquired only by means of pulling. In Sura they taught this following halakha in the name of Rav Ḥisda, while in Pumbedita they taught it in the name of Rav Kahana, and some say in the name of Rava: They taught that movable property is acquired by means of pulling only with regard to items that are not typically lifted due to their weight or for some other reason. But in the case of items that are typically lifted, then yes, they are acquired by means of lifting, but they are not acquired by means of pulling.
(86a:6)יתיב אביי וקאמר להא שמעתא איתיביה רב אדא בר מתנה לאביי הגונב כיס בשבת חייב שכבר נתחייב בגניבה קודם שיבא לידי איסור שבת
(86a:6)Abaye sat and related this halakha. Rav Adda bar Mattana raised an objection to Abaye from a baraita: One who steals a purse on Shabbat is liable for theft. Based on the principle that one who is liable to receive two punishments receives only the greater of the two, in this case one might think that he should be exempt from paying for the theft, as the performance of a prohibited labor on Shabbat is punishable by death. The reason he is liable in this case, in apparent contradiction to that principle, is that he already became liable for the theft as soon as he lifted the purse. This occurred before he came to violate the prohibition of performing prohibited labor on Shabbat by carrying the purse into the public domain.
(86a:7)היה מגרר ויוצא מגרר ויוצא פטור שהרי איסור שבת וגניבה באין כאחד
(86a:7)The baraita continues: If he did not lift the purse but was dragging it on the ground and exiting the private domain, continuously dragging and exiting, he is exempt, as the prohibition of performing labor on Shabbat and the prohibition of theft are violated simultaneously the moment he drags the purse out of the owner’s property into the public domain. Therefore, he receives only the greater punishment, death, for carrying on Shabbat.
(86a:8)והרי כיס דבר הגבהה הוא ואפילו הכי קני במשיכה א"ל במיתנא אנא נמי במיתנא קא אמינא א"ל במידי דבעי מיתנא
(86a:8)Rav Adda bar Mattana explains his objection: But a purse is an item that can be lifted, and even so it is apparent from the baraita that one acquires it by means of pulling. How then can it be stated that items that are typically lifted are not acquired by pulling? Abaye said to him: The baraita is referring to a case where the thief pulled the purse with a rope. Rav Adda bar Mattana thought that Abaye meant that the thief happened to drag it with a rope, and he responded: I also state my question even in a case where he pulled the purse with a rope, as it is still evident that one can acquire the purse by means of pulling instead of lifting. Abaye said to him: I meant that the baraita is referring to an item that requires a rope. It is a purse that is so large that it cannot be lifted and must be pulled, therefore it is acquired by means of pulling.
(86a:9)תא שמע ברשות מוכר לא קנה עד שיגביהנה או עד שיוציאנה מרשותו אלמא מידי דבר הגבהה אי בעי בהגבהה קני ליה ואי בעי במשיכה קני ליה אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק לצדדין קתני מידי דבר הגבהה בהגבהה מידי דבר משיכה במשיכה
(86a:9)The Gemara raises another objection. Come and hear: If the merchandise is in the domain of the seller, the buyer does not acquire the merchandise until he lifts it or until he removes it from the domain of the seller. Apparently, with regard to an item that can be lifted, if he so desires he acquires it by lifting, and if he so desires he acquires it by pulling. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: This is not a proof, as it can be explained that the tanna teaches it disjunctively, i.e., the two options are referring to two different cases: In the case of an item that can be lifted, he acquires it by lifting, whereas with regard to regard to an item that can be pulled, he acquires it by pulling.
(86b:1)תא שמע המוכר פירות לחבירו משך ולא מדד קני והא פירות דבני הגבהה נינהו וקתני דקני במשיכה
(86b:1)The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna (84b) that even items that are usually lifted can be acquired by means of pulling: With regard to one who sells produce to another, if the buyer pulled the produce but did not measure it, he has acquired it. The Gemara explains the proof: But produce can be lifted, and yet the mishna teaches that it is acquired by means of pulling.
(86b:2)הכא במאי עסקינן בשליפי רברבי אי הכי אימא סיפא הלוקח פשתן מחבירו לא קנה עד שיטלטלנו ממקום זה למקום אחר אטו פשתן בשליפי רברבי מי לא עבדי שאני פשתן דמשתמיט
(86b:2)The Gemara rejects this proof: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with large bundles that are pulled from place to place and are not carried, due to their size. The Gemara asks: If that is so, say the latter clause of the mishna: One who buys flax from another has not acquired it until he carries it from this place to another place, i.e., it is acquired only though lifting and not through pulling. Is that to say that flax is not prepared in large bundles? The Gemara answers: Yes, flax is different. Unlike other produce, flax is not packed in large bundles, as it would slip from its place. Rather, it is packed in small bundles, and therefore flax is acquired specifically through lifting.
(86b:3)א"ל רבינא לרב אשי ת"ש בהמה גסה נקנית במסירה והדקה בהגבהה דברי ר"מ ור"ש בן אלעזר וחכ"א בהמה דקה במשיכה והא בהמה דקה דבר הגבהה היא וקתני דקני במשיכה שאני בהמה דסרכא
(86b:3)Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Kiddushin 25b): Large domesticated animals are acquired through passing the animal’s leash to the buyer, and small domesticated animals are acquired through lifting; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. And the Rabbis say: Small domesticated animals are acquired through pulling. Ravina explains the proof: But small domesticated animals are creatures that can be lifted, and yet the mishna teaches that one acquires them through pulling. Rav Ashi rejected this proof: Domesticated animals are different, as they cling to the ground and it is difficult to lift them. Therefore, the usual manner of moving animals is to pull them.
(86b:4)רב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו כור בשלשים אני מוכר לך יכול לחזור בו אפילו בסאה האחרונה כור בשלשים סאה בסלע אני מוכר לך ראשון ראשון קנה
(86b:4)§ The Gemara cites another case with regard to sales. Rav and Shmuel both say: If a seller said to a buyer: I am selling you one kor, a measure equivalent to thirty se’a, of grain for the price of thirty sela, the seller can renege on the sale as long as the measuring vessel is not filled, even when only the last se’a has yet to be measured, because he had agreed to sell only a complete kor. By contrast, if the seller said: I am selling you one kor for thirty sela and each se’a is sold for one sela, he cannot completely renege on the sale in the middle of the transaction. This is because the buyer acquires each se’a one by one as it is measured, since the seller sold each se’a individually.
(86b:5)ת"ש אם היתה מדה של אחד מהן ראשון ראשון קנה ואע"ג דלא נתמלאה המדה
(86b:5)The Gemara raises a difficulty from the baraita cited on 85a. Come and hear: If the measuring vessel belonged to one of them, the buyer acquires the items of sale one by one. And since this halakha is stated in general terms, it indicates that the buyer acquires each item as it is placed in the measuring vessel, even though the measuring vessel was not filled.
(86b:6)כגון דאמר ליה הין בשנים עשר סלעים לוג בסלע אני מוכר לך וכדאמר רב כהנא שנתות היו בהין ה"נ שנתות היו במדות
(86b:6)The Gemara answers: The baraita is referring to a case where the seller said to him: I am selling you one hin, a liquid measure equivalent to twelve log, for twelve sela, each log for one sela. And this is in accordance with an observation that Rav Kahana says: In the Temple there were markings on the vessel that measured hin, with which one could measure the different libations. Here too, there were markings on the measuring vessels, and since the measuring vessel indicates at which point each log had been filled, the buyer acquires it. This is comparable to the case of one who sells each se’a individually.
(86b:7)ת"ש השוכר את הפועל לעשות עמו לגורן היום בדינר
(86b:7)The Gemara raises another difficulty. Come and hear: One who hires a laborer in the winter or the spring to work for him in the harvest, for one dinar a day,
