(29a:1)he is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven.
(29a:2)ומודים חכמים לר"מ באבנו סכינו ומשאו שהניחן בראש גגו ונפלו ברוח מצויה והזיקו שהוא חייב ומודה ר"מ לרבנן במעלה קנקנין על הגג ע"מ לנגבן ונפלו ברוח שאינה מצויה והזיקו שהוא פטור
(29a:2)The Gemara comments: And the Rabbis concede to the opinion of Rabbi Meir in the cases of one’s stone, one’s knife, or one’s load, that if he placed them on top of his roof and they fell as a result of being blown off by a typical wind, i.e., one of ordinary force, and they caused damage, that he is liable. And Rabbi Meir concedes to the opinion of the Rabbis in the case of one who puts pitchers [kankanin] on the roof in order to dry them, and they fell as a result of being blown off by an atypical wind, i.e., one of unusual force, and they caused damage, that he is exempt. Evidently, even Rabbi Meir concedes that if one’s property causes damage due to circumstances completely beyond his control, he is exempt.
(29a:3)אלא אמר אביי בתרתי פליגי פליגי בשעת נפילה ופליגי לאחר נפילה
(29a:3)Accordingly, Abaye rejects Rabba’s explanation of Rabbi Yehuda’s statement, that he deems the owner of the jug liable even if he merely attempted to take it off his shoulder and it broke, and offers another explanation. Rather, Abaye said that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree with regard to two different situations. They disagree with regard to a situation where the damage was caused at the time of the person’s fall, and they disagree with regard to a situation where the damage was caused after the person’s fall.
(29a:4)פליגי בשעת נפילה בנתקל פושע מר סבר נתקל פושע הוא ומ"ס נתקל לאו פושע הוא
(29a:4)They disagree in a situation where the damage was caused at the time of the person’s fall, with regard to whether or not one who stumbles, thereby causing his jug to break, is considered negligent. One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that one who stumbles is considered negligent, as his carelessness caused him to stumble. Therefore, he is liable to pay for damage caused by the shards of the jug, which broke as result of his stumbling. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that one who stumbles is not considered negligent.
(29a:5)פליגי לאחר נפילה במפקיר נזקיו מר סבר מפקיר נזקיו חייב ומר סבר פטור
(29a:5)They disagree in a situation where the damage was caused after the person’s fall, with regard to one who renounces ownership of his hazardous property. Presumably, the owner of the jug has no interest in keeping the shards, and it is considered as though he renounced his ownership of them. One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that one who renounces ownership of his hazardous property is liable to pay restitution for damage caused by it, despite the fact that it no longer belongs to him. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that he is exempt from paying restitution, as it does not belong to him anymore.
(29a:6)וממאי מדקתני תרתי הוחלק אחד במים או שלקה בחרסית היינו הך אלא לאו ה"ק הוחלק אחד במים בשעת נפילה או שלקה בחרסית לאחר נפילה
(29a:6)And from where is this interpretation derived? It is derived from the fact that the mishna teaches two possible cases of damage, stating: Another person slipped in the water or was injured by the shards. This case, slipping in the water, is seemingly identical to that case, injured by the shards. Rather, is it not necessary to explain that this is what the mishna is saying: Another person slipped in the water at the time of the person’s fall, or was injured by the shards after the person’s fall?
(29a:7)ומדמתניתין בתרתי ברייתא נמי בתרתי
(29a:7)The Gemara infers: And since the dispute in the mishna is with regard to two situations, the dispute in the baraita between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis must also relate to two situations, as there too, two cases are mentioned, a case where one’s jug broke and a case where one’s camel fell. Apparently, the dispute is with regard to damage caused both at the time of the fall and after the fall. Rabbi Meir holds that one who stumbles and breaks his jug, causing damage to others, is considered negligent and that one who renounces ownership of his hazardous property is liable, and the Rabbis disagree with regard to both issues.
(29a:8)בשלמא כדו משכחת לה או בשעת נפילה או לאחר נפילה אלא גמלו בשלמא לאחר נפילה משכחת לה במפקיר נבלתו אלא בשעת נפילה היכי משכחת לה
(29a:8)The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to the case where one’s jug broke, you find these circumstances either at the time of the fall or after the fall. But with regard to the case where his camel fell, granted, you find this circumstance after the fall, when he renounces his ownership of the carcass, not considering it worth keeping, but how can you find these circumstances at the time of the fall? How can the camel’s falling be considered to be due to the owner’s negligence, possibly rendering him liable to pay for injuries caused by it?
(29a:9)אמר רב אחא כגון דעברה במיא דרך שרעתא דנהרא
(29a:9)Rav Aḥa said: For example, in a case where the camel crossed through water, through the inundation [serata] of a river that overflowed its banks, and it stumbled there, the owner was negligent, as he should not have gone this way.
(29a:10)ה"ד אי דאיכא דרכא אחרינא פושע הוא ואי דליכא דרכא אחרינא אנוס הוא
(29a:10)The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If there was another route, and he nevertheless chose this one, he is clearly negligent according to all opinions. And if there was no other route, he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control, and he is exempt from liability according to all opinions.
(29a:11)אלא משכחת לה דאתקיל ואתקילה ביה גמלא
(29a:11)Rather, you find this circumstance in a case where the owner stumbled and the camel then stumbled on him. In this case, the Sages engage in a dispute whether or not one who stumbles is considered negligent.
(29a:12)מפקיר נזקיו מאי מתכוין איכא
(29a:12)The Gemara asks: According to Abaye’s explanation that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda is with regard to a situation where the owner of the jug renounces ownership of his hazardous property after it falls, what is the meaning of Rabbi Yehuda’s statement that if the owner of the jug acted with intent he is liable? What intention is there after the jug fell and broke?
(29a:13)אמר רב יוסף במתכוין לזכות בחרסיה וכן אמר רב אשי במתכוין לזכות בחרסיה
(29a:13)Rav Yosef said: It is a situation where he intends to acquire the shards of the broken jug, and he does not renounce his ownership of them. It is specifically in that case that Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable to pay for damage caused by the shards. And similarly, Rav Ashi said: It is a situation where he intends to acquire the shards.
(29a:14)רבי אלעזר אמר בשעת נפילה מחלוקת
(29a:14)§ Rabbi Elazar says: The dispute in the baraita is with regard to a situation where the damage occurred at the time of the person’s fall.
(29a:15)אבל לאחר נפילה מאי דברי הכל פטור והא איכא ר"מ דמחייב אלא מאי דברי הכל חייב והא איכא רבנן דפטרי
(29a:15)The Gemara asks: But after the fall, according to this statement, what is the halakha? Does everyone agree that the owner of the jug is exempt from liability? But isn’t there Rabbi Meir, who deems him liable, since he did not remove the shards? Rather, what is the halakha? Does everyone agree that he is liable? But aren’t there the Rabbis, who deem him exempt?
(29a:16)אלא מאי בשעת נפילה אף בשעת נפילה וקמשמע לן כדאביי
(29a:16)The Gemara answers: Rather, what is the explanation of the phrase: At the time of the person’s fall? It means even at the time of the person’s fall, and it teaches us that the dispute is referring to a situation where the damage occurred after the fall and also to a situation where it occurred at the time of the fall, in accordance with Abaye’s explanation of the mishna.
(29b:1)ורבי יוחנן אמר לאחר נפילה מחלוקת
(29b:1)And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute is with regard to a situation where the damage occurred after the fall.
(29b:2)אבל בשעת נפילה מאי דברי הכל פטור והא מדקאמר רבי יוחנן לקמן לא תימא מתניתין ר"מ היא דאמר נתקל פושע הוא מכלל דרבי מאיר מחייב
(29b:2)The Gemara asks: But at the time of the person’s fall, according to this statement, what is the halakha? Does everyone agree that the owner of the jug is exempt from liability? But from the fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan says later (31a), with regard to another mishna in this chapter: Do not say that the mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that one who stumbles is considered negligent, by inference it is clear that he holds that Rabbi Meir deems one who stumbles liable to pay damages. Evidently, it is not unanimously agreed upon that he is exempt.
(29b:3)אלא מאי דברי הכל חייב והא מדקאמר ר' יוחנן לקמן לא תימא מתניתין ר"מ היא דאמר נתקל פושע הוא מכלל דפטרי רבנן
(29b:3)Rather, what is the halakha in this case? Does he say that everyone agrees that he is liable? But from the fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan says later: Do not say that the mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that one who stumbles is considered negligent, by inference it is clear that he holds that the Rabbis deem him exempt.
(29b:4)אלא הא קמ"ל דמפקיר נזקיו דהכא הוא דפטרי רבנן דאנוס הוא אבל מפקיר נזקיו דעלמא מחייבי
(29b:4)The Gemara answers: Rather, this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches us: That the circumstance in which the Rabbis deem one who renounces ownership of his hazardous property exempt is only the situation stated here, i.e., where he stumbled, as he is the victim of circumstances beyond his control. But in the general case of one who renounces ownership of his hazardous property, they deem him liable to pay for damage caused by it.
(29b:5)איתמר מפקיר נזקיו רבי יוחנן ור"א חד אמר חייב וחד אמר פטור
(29b:5)§ It was stated: With regard to one who renounces ownership of his hazardous property that he left in the public domain, there is a dispute between the amora’im Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar. One said that he is liable, and one said that he is exempt.
(29b:6)לימא מאן דמחייב כר"מ ומאן דפטר כרבנן
(29b:6)The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the one who deems him liable holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and the one who deems him exempt holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis?
(29b:7)אליבא דר"מ כ"ע לא פליג כי פליגי אליבא דרבנן מאן דפטר כרבנן ומאן דמחייב אמר לך אנא דאמרי אפי' לרבנן עד כאן לא פטרי רבנן אלא במפקיר נזקיו דהכא משום דאנוס הוא אבל מפקיר נזקיו דעלמא מחייבי
(29b:7)The Gemara responds: No; in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, everyone agrees that one who renounces ownership over his hazardous property is liable. Rather, when they disagree it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. They disagree as to what the opinion of the Rabbis is. The one who deems him exempt holds that his opinion is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And the one who deems him liable could have said to you: I maintain that what I say is correct even according to the opinion of the Rabbis; the Rabbis deem one who renounces ownership over his hazardous property exempt only in the situation here, because he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control. But in a general case of one who renounces ownership of his hazardous property, they deem him liable.
(29b:8)תסתיים דר"א הוא דאמר חייב דאמר רבי אלעזר משום רבי ישמעאל שני דברים אינן ברשותו של אדם ועשאן הכתוב כאילו הן ברשותו ואלו הן בור ברשות הרבים וחמץ משש [שעות] ולמעלה תסתיים
(29b:8)The Gemara suggests: It may be concluded that Rabbi Elazar is the one who says that he is liable, as Rabbi Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: There are two entities that are not in a person’s legal possession and nevertheless the verse rendered them as though they were in his possession with regard to certain halakhic responsibilities. And these are: A pit that he dug in the public domain and leavened bread remaining in his possession on the eve of Passover from six hours, i.e., noon, onward. Although deriving any benefit from the bread is prohibited, and it is therefore no longer in its owner’s legal possession, nevertheless he is commanded to destroy it. The Gemara concludes: It may be concluded that Rabbi Elazar is the one who says that he is liable.
(29b:9)ומי אמר רבי אלעזר הכי והא אמר רבי אלעזר איפכא דתנן ההופך את הגלל ברה"ר והוזק בהן אחר חייב בנזקו ואמר ר"א לא שנו אלא שנתכוין לזכות בהן אבל לא נתכוין לזכות בהן פטור אלמא מפקיר נזקיו פטור
(29b:9)The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Elazar actually say this, that one who renounces ownership of his hazardous objects is liable? But didn’t Rabbi Elazar say the opposite? As we learned in a mishna (30a): In the case of one who turns over dung in the public domain and another person incurred damage due to it, he is liable to pay for his damage. And Rabbi Elazar says: They taught this ruling only in a case where the one who turned over the dung intended to acquire it, but in a case where he did not intend to acquire it he is exempt. Apparently, according to Rabbi Elazar, one who renounces ownership of his hazardous property is exempt, since he is liable only if he intends to take possession of the dung, even if he moved it significantly.
(29b:10)אמר רב אדא בר אהבה שהחזירה למקומה אמר רבינא משל דרב אדא בר אהבה למה הדבר דומה למוצא בור מגולה וכסהו וחזר וגילהו
(29b:10)Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Rabbi Elazar was referring to a case where he returned the dung to its prior place. Therefore, he is exempt unless he intended to acquire it. Ravina said: This can be explained by means of a parable: To what is the statement of Rav Adda bar Ahava comparable? To one who finds an uncovered pit in the public domain and covers it, and then uncovers it again. Since he left the pit as he found it, he is exempt from paying damages, and the liability lies with the one who dug the pit.
(29b:11)א"ל מר זוטרא בריה דרב מרי לרבינא מי דמי התם לא אסתלק להו מעשה ראשון הכא אסתלק להו מעשה ראשון
(29b:11)Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: Is this comparable? There, in the case of the pit, the result of the initial act of digging the pit was not removed, since even when he covered the pit, the pit itself still existed. But here, the result of the initial act was removed, since once the dung was moved from its prior place, there was no longer any hazardous object there. Therefore, by returning it to its place, the hazard is created anew.
(29b:12)הא לא דמי אלא למוצא בור מגולה וטממה וחזר וחפרה דאסתלקו להו מעשה ראשון וקיימא לה ברשותו
(29b:12)Rather, it is comparable only to one who finds an uncovered pit and fills it with dirt and then digs it up again, as in this case the result of the initial act is removed, and the new pit therefore exists in his possession and he is liable. Likewise, one who moves dung in the public domain and then restores it to its prior place is deemed liable whether or not he intends to acquire it.
(29b:13)אלא אמר רב אשי כשהפכה לפחות משלשה
(29b:13)Rather, Rav Ashi said that Rabbi Elazar was referring to a case when he turned it over at a height of less than three handbreadths, which is not considered removal of the dung from its place.
(29b:14)ומאי דוחקיה דר"א לאוקמיה כגון שהפכה לפחות מג' וטעמא דכי נתכוין לזכות בה הא אין מתכוין לזכות בה לא לוקמה למעלה מג' ואע"ג דלא נתכוין לזכות בה חייב
(29b:14)The Gemara asks: But according to this explanation, what forced Rabbi Elazar to interpret the mishna as referring specifically to the unique case where he turned over the dung at a height of less than three handbreadths, and consequently the reason he is liable is that he intended to acquire it, but if he does not intend to acquire it he is not liable? Let him interpret the mishna as referring to a case where he turned over the dung at a height above three handbreadths, in which case even if he did not intend to acquire it, he is liable.
(29b:15)אמר רבא מתני' קשיתיה מאי אריא הפך לתני הגביה אלא ש"מ כל הפך למטה משלשה הוא
(29b:15)Rava said: What forced him was that the mishna was difficult for him. Why does it state specifically that he turned over the dung? Let it teach that he lifted the dung. Rather, learn from the fact that the mishna does not use the term: Lifted, which generally is referring to the act of lifting an object three handbreadths for the purpose of acquisition, that whenever the term turned over is used, it is referring to an act in which the object is lifted to a height of under three handbreadths from the ground.
(29b:16)ומדרבי אלעזר אמר חייב ר' יוחנן אמר פטור
(29b:16)The Gemara concludes: And from the fact that Rabbi Elazar was evidently the one who said that one who renounces ownership of his hazardous object in the public domain is still liable to pay for any damage it causes, Rabbi Yoḥanan is clearly the one who said he is exempt.
(29b:17)ומי א"ר יוחנן הכי והתנן המצניע את הקוץ ואת הזכוכית והגודר גדרו בקוצים וגדר שנפל לרשות הרבים והוזק בהן אחר חייב בנזקו
(29b:17)The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this, that if one renounces ownership of his object he is exempt from liability for any damage it causes? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (30a): With regard to one who conceals a thorn or a piece of glass, or who puts up a fence of thorns, or who puts up a fence that subsequently fell into the public domain, and another person incurred damage due to any of these, he is liable to pay for this person’s damage.
(29b:18)ואמר רבי יוחנן לא שנו אלא במפריח אבל במצמצם פטור מצמצם מאי טעמא פטור לאו משום דהויא ליה בור ברשותו מכלל דחיובא דבור ברשות הרבים הוא אלמא מפקיר נזקיו חייב
(29b:18)And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who puts up a fence of thorns, they taught that he is liable only in a case where he projects the thorns out into the public domain, but in a case where he restricts them to his own property, he is exempt. The Gemara infers: In a case where he restricts them, what is the reason that he is exempt? Is it not because it is considered a pit on his own property? By inference, the liability in the category of Pit, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, is in the public domain, where a pit generally does not belong to the one who dug it. Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that one who renounces ownership of his hazardous property is liable.
(29b:19)לא לעולם אימא לך מפקיר נזקיו פטור ומצמצם מ"ט פטור משום דאתמר עלה אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא לפי שאין דרכן של בני אדם להתחכך בכתלים
(29b:19)The Gemara answers: No, actually I could say to you that in principle, one who renounces ownership of his hazardous property is exempt. Nevertheless, one who puts up a fence of thorns is liable, because he does not renounce ownership of the thorns that protrude into the public domain. And in a case where he restricts the thorns to his own property, what is the reason he is exempt? The reason is not that he is not liable to pay for the damage of a pit in his own property, but rather because it was stated about this case that Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: He is exempt because it is not the typical manner of people to rub against walls, but to keep a small distance from them. Therefore, if a pedestrian is injured by the thorns, it is considered an unusual accident, for which the owner of the fence is not liable.
(29b:20)ומי אמר ר' יוחנן הכי והא א"ר יוחנן הלכה כסתם משנה ותנן החופר בור ברה"ר ונפל לתוכו שור או חמור ומת חייב
(29b:20)The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say that one who renounces ownership of his hazardous objects is exempt? But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say that in general, the halakha is in accordance with an unattributed mishna, and we learned in an unattributed mishna (50b): In the case of one who digs a pit in the public domain and an ox or a donkey fell into it and died, he is liable. This mishna is referring to one who digs a pit in the public domain, where it is not owned by the one who dug it, yet the mishna deems him liable.
(29b:21)אלא לעולם רבי יוחנן אמר חייב
(29b:21)The Gemara concludes: Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan is actually the one who said that one who renounces ownership of his hazardous objects is liable.
(29b:22)ומדרבי יוחנן אמר חייב ר"א אמר פטור והאמר ר"א
(29b:22)The Gemara asks: And from the fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that he is liable, is it evident that Rabbi Elazar said that he is exempt? But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar say
