(49a:1)א"כ משהאשה יולדת משבחת אלא שמין את הולדות כמה הן יפין ונותן לבעל ואם אין לה בעל נותן ליורשיו
(49a:1)If so, the consequences would be absurd, as when a woman gives birth her value increases. Rather, the court appraises how much the offspring are worth, and the one liable for the damage gives that amount to the husband. And if she does not have a husband, e.g., her husband died, he gives the money to his heirs.
(49a:2)היתה שפחה ונשתחררה או גיורת פטור:
(49a:2)If the pregnant woman was a Canaanite maidservant and then she was emancipated, or a convert, and she was married to an emancipated Canaanite slave or to a convert who died without any heirs, the one who caused the damage is exempt from paying compensation for miscarried offspring. This is because this payment is made specifically to the husband, not to the woman.
(49a:3)גמ׳ טעמא דמתכוין לחבירו הא מתכוין לאשה משלם דמי ולדות לימא תיהוי תיובתא דרב אדא בר אהבה דאמר רב אדא בר אהבה שוורים שנתכוונו לאשה פטורים מדמי ולדות
(49a:3)GEMARA: The first clause of the mishna indicates that the reason the owner is exempt from paying compensation for the offspring when an ox unintentionally gores a pregnant woman is specifically that it was intending to gore another ox. By inference, if it was intending to gore the woman, the owner pays compensation for miscarried offspring. Shall we say that this should be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Adda bar Ahava, as Rav Adda bar Ahava says: With regard to oxen that intended to gore a woman and then did so, the owners are exempt from paying compensation for miscarried offspring?
(49a:4)אמר לך רב אדא בר אהבה הוא הדין דאפי' נתכוונו לאשה נמי פטורים מדמי ולדות והא דקתני שור שהיה מתכוין לחבירו איידי דקא בעי למיתנא סיפא אדם שהיה מתכוין לחבירו דהכי כתיב קרא קתני רישא נמי שור שהיה מתכוין לחבירו
(49a:4)The Gemara answers that Rav Adda bar Ahava could have said to you: The same is true, that even if the oxen intended to gore the woman, the owners are also exempt from paying compensation for miscarried offspring. As for that which is taught in the mishna: An ox that was intending to gore another ox, it is taught this way since it wants to teach the latter clause: A person that was intending to injure another person, as this case is written explicitly in the verse: “And if men struggle and hurt a pregnant woman and her offspring emerge” (Exodus 21:22). In the case in the verse, the assailant intended to injure another person but injured the woman instead. Therefore, the mishna also teaches the first clause in that style: An ox that was intending to gore another ox.
(49a:5)אמר רב פפא שור שנגח את השפחה ויצאו ילדיה משלם דמי ולדות מאי טעמא חמרתא מעברתא בעלמא הוא דאזיק דאמר קרא (בראשית כב, ה) שבו לכם פה עם החמור עם הדומה לחמור:
(49a:5)Rav Pappa says: In the case of an ox that gored a Canaanite maidservant, and her offspring emerged due to miscarriage, the owner pays compensation for miscarried offspring. What is the reason? The ox injured a mere pregnant donkey. With regard to the matter of compensation for offspring, who would be the property of the master were they to be born, a Canaanite slave is considered property of the master. As the verse states that Abraham addressed Eliezer, who was a Canaanite, by saying: “You remain here with [im] the donkey” (Genesis 22:5), on which the Sages expound that he was alluding to the idea that Eliezer is of a people [am] that is similar to a donkey. Therefore, the case of an ox goring a Canaanite maidservant is not included in the Torah’s exemption from paying compensation for miscarried offspring.
(49a:6)כיצד משלם דמי ולדות: דמי ולדות שבח ולדות מיבעי ליה הכי נמי קאמר כיצד משלם דמי ולדות ושבח ולדות שמין את האשה כמה היא יפה עד שלא ילדה וכמה היא יפה משילדה:
(49a:6)§ The mishna teaches: How does he pay compensation for miscarried offspring? The court appraises how much the value of the woman increased due to the offspring. The Gemara asks: Would this be a correct interpretation of the term: Compensation for miscarried offspring? If this is how the sum is calculated, the mishna should have stated: How does he pay the increase in value due to the offspring? The Gemara answers: That is also what the tanna is saying: How does he pay compensation for miscarried offspring and the increase in value due to the offspring? In other words, apart from evaluating the compensation for the miscarried offspring, the court also appraises the value of the woman by calculating how much she would be worth if sold as a maidservant before giving birth, and how much she would be worth after giving birth.
(49a:7)אמר רשב"ג א"כ משהאשה יולדת משבחת: מאי קאמר אמר רבה ה"ק וכי אשה משבחת קודם שתלד יותר מלאחר שתלד והלא אשה משבחת לאחר שתלד יותר מקודם שתלד אלא שמין את הולדות ונותנין לבעל
(49a:7)§ The mishna teaches: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If so, the consequences would be absurd, as when a woman gives birth her value increases. The Gemara asks: What is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel saying? Rabba said: This is what he is saying: But is the monetary value of a woman higher before she gives birth than after she gives birth? But isn’t the opposite true, that the monetary value of a woman is higher after giving birth than before giving birth, since the concern for her dying during childbirth, which lowers her monetary value prior to giving birth, is no longer a concern? Rather, the court appraises the value of the fetuses and gives that amount to the husband.
(49a:8)תניא נמי הכי וכי אשה משבחת קודם שתלד יותר מלאחר שתלד והלא אשה משבחת לאחר שתלד יותר מקודם שתלד אלא שמין את הולדות ונותנין לבעל
(49a:8)This explanation of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s statement is also taught in a baraita: But is the monetary value of a woman higher before she gives birth than after she gives birth? But isn’t the opposite true, that the monetary value of a woman is higher after giving birth than before giving birth? Rather, the court appraises the value of the fetuses and gives that amount to the husband.
(49a:9)רבא אמר הכי קתני וכי אשה למי שיולדת משבחת ואין לעצמה בשבח ולדות כלום אלא שמין את הולדות ונותנין לבעל ושבח ולדות חולקין
(49a:9)Rava said: This is what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is teaching: But is the value of the woman higher only for the one for whom she gives birth, i.e., her husband, and she herself does not have any increase in value at all due to the offspring? A pregnant woman’s monetary value is increased on account of her pregnancy, beyond the monetary value of the offspring. Rather, the court appraises the value of the offspring and gives it to the husband. And in addition, the husband and wife divide the increase in her value due to the offspring.
(49a:10)תניא נמי הכי אמר רשב"ג וכי אשה למי שיולדת משבחת ואין לעצמה בשבח ולדות כלום אלא שמין נזק בפני עצמו וצער בפני עצמו ושמין את הולדות ונותנין לבעל ושבח ולדות חולקין
(49a:10)This explanation of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s opinion is also taught in a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: But is the value of the woman higher only for the one for whom she gives birth, i.e., her husband, and she herself does not have any increase in value at all due to the offspring? Rather, the court appraises damage by itself and pain by itself, and appraises the value of the offspring and gives it to the husband, and the husband and wife divide the increase in her value due to the offspring.
(49a:11)קשיא דרשב"ג אדרשב"ג
(49a:11)The Gemara asks: The opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the first baraita, that the woman’s value decreases because of pregnancy, poses a difficulty for that of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the second baraita, that it increases.
(49a:12)ל"ק כאן במבכרת כאן בשאינה מבכרת
(49a:12)The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, since each baraita is referring to a different case: Here, the first baraita, which stated that the woman’s value increases after giving birth, is referring to a woman giving birth to her firstborn. Her value decreases prior to birth out of concern that she might die in childbirth. There, the second baraita, which stated that her value increases due to pregnancy, is referring to a woman who is not giving birth to her firstborn.
(49a:13)ורבנן דאמרי שבח ולדות נמי לבעל מאי טעמא כדתנן ממשמע שנאמר (שמות כא, כב) ויצאו ילדיה איני יודע שהיא הרה מה ת"ל הרה לומר לך שבח הריון לבעל
(49a:13)The Gemara asks: And what is the reason of the Rabbis in the second baraita, who say: The increase in her value due to the offspring is also given to the husband? The Gemara answers: They derive it from a redundancy in a verse, as we learned in a baraita: The verse states: “And hurt a pregnant woman and her offspring emerge” (Exodus 21:22). From the fact that it is stated: “And her offspring emerge,” don’t I know by inference that she was pregnant? If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “A pregnant woman,” and not just “a woman”? To inform you that even the increase in her value due to the pregnancy is given to the husband.
(49a:14)ורשב"ג האי הרה מאי דריש ביה מבעי ליה לכדתניא ר"א בן יעקב אומר לעולם אינו חייב עד שיכנה כנגד בית ההריון אמר רב פפא לא תימא כנגד בית הריון ממש אלא כל היכא דסליק ביה שיחמא לולד לאפוקי יד ורגל דלא:
(49a:14)The Gemara asks: And what halakha does Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel expound on this extra word “pregnant”? The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says that one who injures a woman is never liable to pay compensation for miscarried offspring unless he strikes her opposite the womb, i.e., on the abdomen. Rav Pappa said: Do not say that it must be literally opposite the womb. Rather, he is liable if she was struck anywhere that the wound’s impact could reach the offspring, i.e., any part of the torso, to exclude a wound to her hand or foot, for which he is not liable, since it could be argued that it was not the wound to the hand or foot that caused the miscarriage.
(49a:15)היתה שפחה ונשתחררה או גיורת פטור: אמר רבה לא שנו אלא שחבל בה בחיי הגר ומת הגר דכיון דחבל בה בחיי הגר זכה בהו גר וכיון דמת הגר זכה בהו מן הגר אבל חבל בה לאחר מיתת הגר זכיא לה איהי בגוייהו ומיחייב לשלומי לה לדידה
(49a:15)§ The mishna teaches: If the pregnant woman was a maidservant and then she was emancipated, or a convert, he is exempt from the payment of damages for miscarried offspring. Rabba says: They taught this halakha only in a case where one injured her during the lifetime of the convert, i.e., her husband, and the convert died before the payment was given. The reason for this is that since the assailant injured her during the lifetime of the convert, the convert acquires the money, although it is still in the possession of the one liable for the damage. And once the convert dies without heirs, the money is ownerless. Therefore, the assailant acquires it from the convert. Since anyone can assume ownership of ownerless property, the assailant, who already possesses the money, becomes the owner. But if he injured her after the convert had died, she acquires the money, and he must pay the woman herself.
(49a:16)א"ר חסדא מרי דיכי אטו ולדות צררי נינהו וזכיא בהו אלא איתיה לבעל זכה ליה רחמנא ליתיה לבעל לא
(49a:16)Rav Ḥisda said in amazement: Master of this ruling! Is that to say that compensation for the offspring is like bundles of money, and she acquires them when her husband dies? Rabba seems to understand that the pregnant woman assumes ownership of the offspring by virtue of being in possession of them when the husband dies, and therefore has the right to compensation for them. That is not the case. Rather, if the husband is present, the Merciful One grants compensation for the offspring to him, but if the husband is not alive, the Torah does not grant compensation to anyone else.
(49a:17)מיתיבי הכה את האשה ויצאו ילדיה נותן נזק וצער לאשה ודמי ולדות לבעל אין הבעל נותן ליורשיו אין האשה נותן ליורשיה היתה שפחה ונשתחררה או גיורת זכה
(49a:17)The Gemara raises an objection against the opinion of Rabba from the following: If the assailant struck the woman and her offspring emerged due to miscarriage, he gives compensation for damage and pain to the woman and compensation for miscarried offspring to the husband. If the husband is not alive, he gives the compensation for the offspring to his heirs. If the woman is not alive, he gives the payment owed to her to her heirs. If she was a maidservant and then she was emancipated, or a convert, the assailant acquires the money. This indicates that if the husband is no longer alive, the woman doesn’t receive anything.
(49a:18)אמרי ומי עדיפא ממתניתין דאוקימנא שחבל בה בחיי הגר ומת הגר הכא נמי שחבל בה בחיי הגר ומת הגר ואיבעית אימא לאחר מיתת הגר
(49a:18)The Sages said in response to this: But is the baraita preferable to the mishna, which we interpreted as referring to a case where he injured her during the lifetime of the convert, and the convert then died? Here also, it must be explained that he injured her during the lifetime of the convert, and the convert then died. And if you wish, say instead that he injured her even after the death of the convert.
(49b:1)ותני זכתה
(49b:1)And as for the expression in the baraita: He acquires, referring to the one who causes the damage, teach: She acquires.
(49b:2)לימא כתנאי בת ישראל שנשאת לגר ונתעברה ממנו וחבל בה בחיי הגר נותן דמי ולדות לגר לאחר מיתת הגר תני חדא חייב ותני חדא פטור מאי לאו תנאי נינהו לרבה ודאי תנאי היא אלא לרב חסדא מי לימא תנאי היא
(49b:2)The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dispute between Rabba and Rav Ḥisda is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im: With regard to a Jewish woman who was married to a convert, and she became pregnant from him, and someone injured her, causing her to miscarry: If this was during the lifetime of the convert, the assailant gives compensation for miscarried offspring to the convert, i.e., her husband. If this was after the death of the convert, it is taught in one baraita that the assailant is liable, and it is taught in one baraita that the assailant is exempt. What, is it not a dispute between tanna’im? The Gemara clarifies: According to the opinion of Rabba, it is certainly a dispute between tanna’im. His opinion does not accord with the second baraita. But according to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, shall we say that it is a dispute between tanna’im?
(49b:3)ל"ק הא רבנן הא רשב"ג
(49b:3)This is not necessarily so, as Rav Ḥisda could say that both baraitot are in accordance with his opinion. As for the difference between them, that is not difficult. They can be explained as referring to the increase in the woman’s value due to the offspring, which is subject to dispute in the mishna, rather than referring to the payment of compensation for miscarried offspring. This baraita, which taught that he is exempt, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that the increase in her value on account of the offspring belongs to the husband. That baraita, which taught that he is liable, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who maintains that the woman has a share in her increase in value due to pregnancy, and this is paid even if the incident occurred after the husband’s death.
(49b:4)אי רשב"ג מאי אריא לאחר מיתה אפי' מחיים נמי אית לה פלגא מחיים אית לה פלגא לאחר מיתה כוליה
(49b:4)The Gemara asks: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, why state specifically that it occurs after the death of the husband? Even during the husband’s lifetime, she also has a half share, as explained earlier in the discussion. The Gemara answers: While he is alive, she has a half share, but after his death, all of it belongs to her.
(49b:5)ואיבעית אימא הא והא רשב"ג כאן בשבח ולדות כאן בדמי ולדות
(49b:5)And if you wish, say instead that both this baraita and that baraita are in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, but they refer to different payments. Here, the baraita that taught that he is liable, is referring to the increase in her value due to the offspring, which belongs partly to the woman, and if the husband dies, she acquires the rights to all of it. By contrast, there, the baraita that taught that he is exempt, is referring to compensation for miscarried offspring, which belongs exclusively to her husband. Since he is a convert, the one liable for damage is exempt after his death.
(49b:6)The Sages said, in questioning this answer: Why is there a difference between the two cases? From the halakha that after the husband’s death the woman acquires his share of the increase in her value due to the offspring, let it be derived that according to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel she also acquires the rights to the compensation for miscarried offspring if she was wounded after his death. Moreover, from the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, let us derive that this is also the opinion of the Rabbis, since there is no dispute between them with regard to the payment of compensation for miscarried offspring.
(49b:7)אמרי לא שבח ולדות דשייכא ידה בגוייהו זכיא בהו בכולהו דמי ולדות דלא שייכא ידה בגוייהו לא זכיא בהו כלל:
(49b:7)In response, the Sages said: No, the first assumption is untenable, since with regard to the increase in her value due to the offspring, in which she has a share from the outset, she acquires all of it after her husband’s death. By contrast, with regard to the compensation for miscarried offspring, in which she does not have a share from the outset, she does not acquire the rights to it at all, since she has no greater claim to this than any other individual does.
(49b:8)בעי מיניה רב ייבא סבא מר"נ המחזיק בשטרותיו של גר מהו מאן דמחזיק בשטרא אדעתיה דארעא הוא דמחזיק ובארעא הא לא אחזיק ושטרא נמי לא קנה דלאו דעתיה אשטרא או דלמא דעתיה נמי אשטרא
(49b:8)§ Rav Yeiva the Elder raises a dilemma to Rav Naḥman: With regard to one who takes possession of the documents of a convert, what is the halakha after the death of the convert? On the one hand, it can be argued that one who takes possession of the document takes possession with the intention of acquiring the land that the document states is under lien, and since he did not take possession of the land itself, he also does not acquire the document. This is because he had no intention to acquire the document, but just the property specified in the document. Therefore, since the convert has died, perhaps the lien is canceled and can no longer be collected, or perhaps his intention is also to acquire the document, and the paper on which it is written belongs to him.
(49b:9)א"ל עני מורי וכי לצור ע"פ צלוחיתו הוא צריך א"ל לצור ולצור
(49b:9)Rav Naḥman said to him: Answer this, my Master: Does he need to acquire the document to use as paper to cover the opening of his flask? Why would he want the document if it does not grant him ownership of the land described therein? Rav Yeiva the Elder said to him: Indeed, his intention is even to cover the flask and to cover it with the paper, albeit a mundane purpose.
(49b:10)אמר רבה משכונו של ישראל ביד גר ומת הגר ובא ישראל אחר והחזיק בו מוציאין אותו מידו מ"ט כיון דמית ליה גר פקע ליה שעבודיה
(49b:10)Rabba says: In a case where the collateral of a Jew was in the possession of a convert who lent him money, and the convert died, and another Jew came and took possession of it, then, since the convert has no heirs, the court appropriates it from his possession and returns it to its owner. What is the reason? Since the convert died, his lien on the property is abrogated. Therefore, the deposit automatically returns to its owner, and no one else has the right to take it.
(49b:11)משכונו של גר ביד ישראל ומת הגר ובא ישראל אחר והחזיק בו זה קנה כנגד מעותיו וזה קנה את השאר
(49b:11)By contrast, if the collateral of a convert is in the possession of a Jew who lent him money and the convert died, and another Jew came and took possession of it, this one, i.e., the one owed money, acquires a share of the collateral corresponding to the money owed to him by the convert, and that one, i.e., the one who took possession of it, acquires the rest.
(49b:12)ואמאי תקני ליה חצירו דהאמר רבי יוסי בר חנינא חצירו של אדם קונה לו שלא מדעתו
(49b:12)The Gemara asks: But why doesn’t the creditor acquire the entire collateral? If it is in his possession, let his courtyard effect acquisition for him, as doesn’t Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina say: A person’s courtyard effects acquisition for him even without his knowledge?
(49b:13)אמרי הכא במאי עסקינן דליתיה כל היכא דאיתא לדידיה דאי בעי מקני [מצי] קני קניא ליה [נמי] חצירו כל היכא דליתיה לדידיה דאי בעי הוא למיקני לא מצי קני חצירו נמי לא קניא
(49b:13)The Sages said in response: Here we are dealing with a case where the creditor is not standing next to the courtyard. Anywhere that he is present, next to the collateral, so that if he wants to acquire it he could pick it up and acquire it himself, his courtyard also effects acquisition for him. But anywhere that he is not present, next to the collateral, so that if he wants to acquire it he could not acquire it, his courtyard also does not effect acquisition for him.
(49b:14)והלכתא דליתיה בחצירו דלא קנה:
(49b:14)The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that where the creditor is not present in his courtyard, he does not acquire the rest of the collateral.
(49b:15)מתני׳ החופר בור ברה"י ופתחו לרה"ר או ברה"ר ופתחו לרה"י ברה"י ופתחו לרה"י אחר חייב:
(49b:15)MISHNA: One who digs part of a pit on private property and opens its entrance in the public domain, or digs a pit in the public domain and opens its entrance on private property, or digs a pit on private property and opens its entrance on another person’s private property, is liable for damage caused by the pit in each case.
(49b:16)גמ׳ ת"ר החופר בור ברה"י ופתחו לרה"ר (ברה"ר ופתחו לרה"י) חייב וזהו בור האמור בתורה דברי ר' ישמעאל ר"ע אומר הפקיר רשותו ולא הפקיר בורו זהו בור האמור בתורה
(49b:16)GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: One who digs a pit on private property and opens its entrance in the public domain, or who digs a pit in the public domain and opens its entrance on private property is liable, and this is the case of Pit that is stated in the Torah; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: With regard to one who renounced ownership of his property but did not renounce ownership of his pit located in the property, this is the case of Pit that is stated in the Torah.
(49b:17)אמר רבה בבור ברה"ר כ"ע לא פליגי דמיחייב מ"ט אמר קרא (שמות כא, לג) כי יפתח וכי יכרה אם על פתיחה חייב על כרייה לא כל שכן אלא שעל עסקי פתיחה ועל עסקי כרייה באה לו לא נחלקו אלא
(49b:17)In explanation of this dispute, Rabba says: With regard to a pit that a person digs or opens into the public domain, everyone agrees that he is liable for damage that occurs as a result. What is the reason? The verse states: “And if a man shall open a pit,” and it also states: “If a man shall dig a pit” (Exodus 21:33), which raises the question: If one is liable for opening a pit by removing the cover of a pit that has already been dug, then is it not all the more so obvious that he should be liable for digging a new pit? What, then, does the latter phrase add? Rather, the interpretation of the verse must be that the responsibility for the pit comes to him by engaging in opening the pit and by engaging in digging the pit. Although he does not own the area itself, he is liable for creating a public hazard. They disagree only
