(36a:1)פעמים ששניהם באשם פעמים שהשוכר בחטאת והשואל באשם פעמים שהשוכר באשם והשואל בחטאת
(36a:1)there are times that both are liable to bring a guilt-offering; there are times that the renter is liable to bring a sin-offering and the borrower is liable to bring a guilt-offering; there are times that the renter is liable to bring a guilt-offering and the borrower is liable to bring a sin-offering.
(36a:2)הא כיצד כפירת ממון אשם ביטוי שפתים חטאת
(36a:2)The Gemara elaborates: How so? One who takes a false oath that involves the denial of a monetary matter is liable to bring a guilt-offering. One who takes a false oath on an utterance of the lips that involves no denial of a monetary debt is liable to bring a sin-offering.
(36a:3)פעמים ששניהם בחטאת כגון שמתה כדרכה ואמרו נאנסה שוכר דבין כך ובין כך מיפטר פטור בחטאת שואל דבין כך ובין כך חיובי מיחייב בחטאת
(36a:3)The Gemara elaborates: There are times that both are liable to bring a sin-offering. This is in a case where the cow died in its typical manner and the renter and the borrower both said that it died due to circumstances beyond his control. A renter, who in any case is exempt from paying whether it died of natural causes or due to circumstances beyond his control, is liable to bring a sin-offering if he took a false oath. A borrower, who in any case is liable to pay regardless of the circumstances of its death, is liable to bring a sin-offering if he took a false oath. In both cases, the oath involved no denial of monetary debt.
(36a:4)There are times that both are liable to bring a guilt-offering. This is in a case where the cow was stolen from a borrower, and the renter and the borrower both said that it died due to ordinary labor. That is a case where both denied a monetary matter, as they are both liable to pay in a case of theft, and both take an oath on a claim with which they seek to exempt themselves.
(36a:5)שוכר בחטאת ושואל באשם כגון שמתה כדרכה ואמרו מתה מחמת מלאכה שוכר דבין כך ובין כך מיפטר פטור חייב בחטאת שואל דמיחייב במתה כדרכה וקא פטר נפשיה במתה מחמת מלאכה באשם
(36a:5)There are times when a renter is liable to bring a sin-offering and a borrower is liable to bring a guilt-offering. This is in a case where the cow died in its typical manner and the renter and the borrower both said that it died due to ordinary labor. A renter, who in any case is exempt, as he is exempt from paying in cases where the ox was damaged or died due to circumstances beyond his control, is liable to bring a sin-offering, as the false oath involved no denial of monetary debt. A borrower, who is liable to pay when the cow died in its typical manner and attempted to exempt himself with the claim that it died due to ordinary labor, is liable to bring a guilt-offering.
(36a:6)שוכר באשם ושואל בחטאת כגון שנגנבה ואמרו מתה כדרכה שוכר הוא דמיחייב בגניבה ואבידה וקא פטר נפשיה במתה כדרכה באשם שואל דבין כך ובין כך חיובי מיחייב בחטאת
(36a:6)There are times when a renter is liable to bring a guilt-offering and a borrower is liable to bring a sin-offering. This is in a case where the cow was stolen from the borrower, and the renter and the borrower both said that it died in its typical manner. The renter, who is liable to pay in cases of theft and loss and attempted to exempt himself with the claim that it died in its typical manner, is liable to bring a guilt-offering. A borrower, who in any case is liable to pay, is liable to bring a sin-offering.
(36a:7)מאי קמ"ל לאפוקי מדרבי אמי דאמר כל שבועה שהדיינים משביעים אותה אין חייבין עליה משום שבועת ביטוי שנאמר (ויקרא ה, ד) או נפש כי תשבע לבטא בשפתים כי תשבע מעצמה קמ"ל דלא כר' אמי
(36a:7)The Gemara asks: What is Rabbi Yirmeya teaching us with this systematic presentation of these cases? They are merely details based on established halakhic principles. The Gemara answers: His statement serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Ami, who says: With regard to any oath that the judges administer, one is not liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath on an utterance, as it is stated in the passage concerning the obligation to bring an offering for taking a false oath: “Or if a soul takes an oath clearly to utter with lips” (Leviticus 5:4). The Gemara infers: The liability to bring an offering for taking a false oath applies only to one who takes an oath on his own initiative, but not when the oath is administered by others. Rabbi Yirmeya teaches us that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami, as one is liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath on an utterance even if it was administered by another.
(36a:8)אתמר שומר שמסר לשומר רב אמר פטור ור' יוחנן אמר חייב
(36a:8)It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to a bailee who conveyed to another bailee the deposit with which he was entrusted. Rav says: He is exempt from payment in the same cases in which he is exempt when the deposit is in his possession. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is liable to pay even in cases of damage due to circumstances beyond his control.
(36a:9)אמר אביי לטעמיה דרב לא מבעיא שומר חנם שמסר לשומר שכר דעלויי עלייה לשמירתו אלא אפילו שומר שכר שמסר לשומר חנם דגרועי גרעה לשמירתו פטור מאי טעמא דהא מסרה לבן דעת
(36a:9)Abaye says: According to Rav’s line of reasoning, it is not necessary to state his ruling in a case where he was initially an unpaid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to a paid bailee, as in that case the unpaid bailee enhanced the level of his safeguarding, since a paid bailee is liable to pay in instances where an unpaid bailee is exempt. But even in the case of a paid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to an unpaid bailee, where the paid bailee diminished the level of his safeguarding, he is exempt. What is the reason? He is exempt because he conveyed the deposit to a mentally competent person, thereby effectively safeguarded the deposit.
(36a:10)ולטעמיה דר' יוחנן לא מיבעיא שומר שכר שמסר לשומר חנם דגרועי גרעה לשמירתו אלא אפי' ש"ח שמסר לשומר שכר דעלויי עלייה לשמירתו חייב דא"ל אין רצוני שיהא פקדוני ביד אחר
(36a:10)According to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s line of reasoning, it is not necessary to state his ruling in a case where he was initially a paid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to an unpaid bailee, as the paid bailee diminished the level of his safeguarding, since an unpaid bailee is exempt in instances where a paid bailee is liable to pay. But even in the case of an unpaid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to a paid bailee, where the unpaid bailee enhanced the level of his safeguarding, he is liable to pay. What is the reason? He is liable because the owner of the deposit said to him: It is not my desire that my deposit be in the possession of another bailee.
(36a:11)אמר רב חסדא הא דרב לאו בפירוש אתמר אלא מכללא דהנהו גינאי דכל יומא הוו מפקדי מרייהו גבה דההיא סבתא יומא חד אפקדינהו לגבי חד מינייהו שמע קלא בי הלולא נפק אזל אפקדינהו לגבה דההיא סבתא אדאזל ואתא אגנוב מרייהו
(36a:11)Rav Ḥisda said: This statement that is attributed to Rav was not stated explicitly. Rather, it was inferred from another statement of his, as it is related: There were these gardeners who each day would deposit their spades with a certain old woman. One day they deposited their spades with one of gardeners. He heard noise from a wedding hall and set out and went there. He deposited the spades with that old woman. In the time that he went and came back from the wedding, their spades were stolen.
(36a:12)אתא לקמיה דרב ופטריה מאן דחזא סבר משום שומר שמסר לשומר פטור ולא היא שאני התם דכל יומא נמי אינהו גופייהו גבה דההיא סבתא הוו מפקדי להו
(36a:12)The case came before Rav, and Rav exempted the gardener who deposited the spades with the old woman. One who observed Rav’s ruling thought that Rav issued that ruling due to the fact that a bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is exempt. But that is not so. There, in the case of the spades, it is different, as the gardeners themselves would deposit their spades with that old woman. Since the gardeners cannot claim that it is not their desire for their deposit to be in the possession of this old woman, the gardener who did so is exempt.
(36a:13)יתיב ר' אמי וקאמר לה להא שמעתא איתיביה ר' אבא בר ממל לר' אמי השוכר פרה מחבירו והשאילה לאחר ומתה כדרכה ישבע השוכר שמתה כדרכה והשואל משלם לשוכר ואם איתא לימא ליה אין רצוני שיהא פקדוני ביד אחר א"ל הכא במאי עסקינן בשנתנו לו (רשות הבעלים) להשאיל
(36a:13)The Gemara relates: Rabbi Ami sat and stated this halakha. Rabbi Abba bar Memel raised an objection to Rabbi Ami from the mishna: In the case of one who rents a cow from another, and this renter lends it to another person, and the cow dies in its typical manner in the possession of the borrower, the halakha is that the renter takes an oath to the owner of the cow that the cow died in its typical manner, and the borrower pays the renter for the cow that he borrowed. And if the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan is so, let the owner say to the renter: It is not my desire that my deposit be in the possession of another bailee, and the renter should be liable to pay because he violated the owner’s wishes. Rabbi Ami said to him: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where the owner gave the renter permission to lend the deposit to another.
(36a:14)אי הכי לבעלים בעי לשלומי דאמרו ליה לדעתך
(36a:14)The Gemara asks: If so, the borrower should be required to pay the owner, as the owner sanctioned the borrowing. Rabbi Abba bar Memel answers: The case in the mishna is one where the owner said to the renter: Lend this deposit to another at your discretion. Therefore, it is not considered as if the owner lent it to the borrower.
(36a:15)מתיב רמי בר חמא המפקיד מעות אצל חבירו צררן והפשילן לאחוריו מסרן לבנו ובתו הקטנים ונעל בפניהם שלא כראוי חייב שלא שמר כדרך השומרים
(36a:15)Rami bar Ḥama raises an objection from a mishna (42a): In the case of one who deposited coins with another, and that bailee bound it in a cloth and slung it behind him, or conveyed them to his minor son or daughter for safeguarding, or locked the door before the coins in an inappropriate, i.e., insufficient, manner to secure them, the bailee is liable to pay for the coins, as he did not safeguard the coins in the manner typical of bailees.
(36a:16)טעמא דקטנים הא גדולים פטור אמאי נימא ליה אין רצוני שיהא פקדוני ביד אחר
(36a:16)The Gemara infers: The reason he is liable to pay is that he conveyed the coins to his minor children, but if he conveyed them to his adult son or daughter he is exempt. Why? Let the owner say to him as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is not my desire that my deposit be in the possession of another bailee, and therefore even if the children are adults the bailee should be liable to pay.
(36a:17)אמר רבא כל המפקיד
(36a:17)Rava said: No proof can be cited, as it is clear that in the case of anyone who deposits an item with another,
(36b:1)על דעת אשתו ובניו הוא מפקיד
(36b:1)it is with the awareness that at times the bailee’s wife and his children will safeguard the item that he deposits it, as the bailee cannot be with the deposit at all times.
(36b:2)אמרי נהרדעי דיקא נמי דקתני או שמסרן לבנו ובתו הקטנים חייב הא לבנו ולבתו הגדולים פטור מכלל דלאחרים לא שנא גדולים ולא שנא קטנים חייב דאם כן ליתני קטנים סתמא שמע מינה
(36b:2)The Sages of Neharde’a say: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Or if he conveyed the coins to his minor son or daughter for safeguarding, he is liable to pay. But if he conveyed them to his adult son and daughter, he is exempt. By inference, one can conclude that with regard to others, it is no different if they are adults and it is no different if they are minors. Either way, the bailee is liable to pay, as, if there were a difference, let the tanna teach: If he conveyed the coins to minors, without qualification. The Gemara concludes: Since the tanna specifically addressed the case of one’s minor children, learn from the wording of the mishna that the difference between minors and adults exists only with regard to one’s children.
(36b:3)אמר רבא הלכתא שומר שמסר לשומר חייב לא מבעיא שומר שכר שמסר לשומר חנם דגרועי גרעה לשמירתו אלא אפילו שומר חנם שמסר לשומר שכר חייב מאי טעמא דאמר ליה את מהימנת לי בשבועה האיך לא מהימן לי בשבועה:
(36b:3)Rava says: The halakha is: A bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is liable to pay. It is not necessary to say that this is the halakha if he was a paid bailee who conveyed the deposit to an unpaid bailee, as in that case the first bailee diminished the level of his safeguarding, as an unpaid bailee is exempt from paying in instances where a paid bailee is obligated to do so. But even if it was initially an unpaid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to a paid bailee, the first bailee is liable to pay. What is the reason that he is liable in that case? He is liable, as the owner of the deposit can say to him: You are trustworthy to me when you take an oath that the item was stolen or lost. That person is not trustworthy to me when he takes an oath.
(36b:4)אתמר פשע בה ויצאת לאגם ומתה כדרכה אביי משמיה דרבה אמר חייב רבא משמיה דרבה אמר פטור
(36b:4)It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute: In the case of one who was negligent in safeguarding an animal, and it went into a marsh, where it was susceptible to thieves and predatory animals, but it died in its typical manner despite this negligence, i.e., it was neither stolen nor devoured, Abaye says in the name of Rabba: The bailee is liable to pay. Rava says in the name of Rabba: The bailee is exempt from doing so.
(36b:5)אביי משמיה דרבה אמר חייב כל דיינא דלא דאין כי האי דינא לאו דיינא הוא לא מבעיא למ"ד תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב דחייב אלא אפילו למ"ד פטור הכא חייב מ"ט דאמרינן הבלא דאגמא קטלה
(36b:5)The Gemara elaborates. Abaye said in the name of Rabba: He is liable to pay, and any judge who does not rule in accordance with this halakha is not a judge. It is not necessary to say that the bailee is liable in this case, according to the one who says: In a case where the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, one is liable to pay. According to this opinion, it is obvious that the bailee is liable to pay. But even according to the one who says: If the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident one is exempt, here the bailee is still liable to pay. What is the reason that he is liable? It is because we say: The air of the marsh killed the animal. The negligence led to the death of the animal, and it was not due to circumstances beyond his control.
(36b:6)רבא משמיה דרבה אמר פטור כל דיינא דלא דאין כי האי דינא לאו דיינא הוא לא מיבעיא למ"ד תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס פטור דפטור אלא אפילו למ"ד חייב הכא פטור מאי טעמא דאמרינן מלאך המות מה לי הכא ומה לי התם
(36b:6)Rava says in the name of Rabba: He is exempt, and any judge who does not rule in accordance with this halakha is not a judge. It is not necessary to say that the bailee is exempt in this case, according to the one who says: In a case where the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, one is exempt from payment. According to this opinion, it is obvious that the bailee is exempt. But even according to the one who says: In a case where the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, one is liable to pay, here the bailee is still exempt from payment. What is the reason that he is exempt? It is because we say with regard to the Angel of Death, who causes death by natural causes: What difference is there to me if the animal was here, and what difference is there to me if the animal was there? The cause of the animal’s death was natural, and there is no relevance given to the location of the death. Consequently, the bailee is exempt.
(36b:7)The Gemara notes: And Abaye concedes that if the animal returned from the marsh to its owner’s house and died there that the bailee is exempt. What is the reason that he is exempt? He is exempt due to the fact that the animal returned, and since it was able to return there is no justification to say that the air of the marsh killed it. And Rava concedes that anytime the animal was stolen from the marsh and then dies in its typical manner in the house of the thief that the bailee is liable to pay. What is the reason that he is liable to pay? He is liable because even if the Angel of Death spared the life of the animal, it would be standing in the house of the thief due to the negligence of the bailee.
(36b:8)אמר ליה אביי לרבא לדידך דאמרת מלאך המות מה לי הכא ומה לי התם האי דאותביה ר' אבא בר ממל לרבי אמי ושני ליה בשנתנו לו בעלים רשות להשאיל ולימא ליה מלאך המות מה לי הכא ומה לי התם
(36b:8)Abaye said to Rava: According to you, who said with regard to the Angel of Death: What difference is there to me if the animal was here and what difference is there to me if the animal was there? How will you explain the exchange between Rabbi Abba bar Memel and Rabbi Ami? As there is that objection that was raised by Rabbi Abba bar Memel to Rabbi Ami from the mishna with regard to one who rents a cow from another, and then lends it to another person, and Rabbi Ami answered him: It is a case where the owner gave the renter permission to lend the deposit. Abaye states his challenge: But according to your explanation, let Rabbi Ami say to him that the bailee is exempt because with regard to the Angel of Death, what difference is there to me if the animal was here, and what difference is there to me if the animal was there. If the death would have happened regardless of the location of the animal, it makes no difference whether it was in the possession of the first renter or in the possession of the one he lent it to.
(36b:9)א"ל לדידכו דמתניתו אין רצוני שיהא פקדוני ביד אחר איכא לאותבה לההיא לדידי דאמינא אנת מהימנת לי בשבועה והאיך לא מהימן לי בשבועה ליכא לאותבה כלל
(36b:9)Rava said to Abaye: According to you, that you teach that a bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is liable to pay because the owner can claim: It is not my desire that my deposit be in the possession of another bailee, there is room to raise that objection. But according to me, as I say that a bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is liable to pay because the owner can claim: You are trustworthy to me when you take an oath that the item was stolen or lost; that person is not trustworthy to me when he takes an oath, there is no room to raise that objection at all.
(36b:10)מתיב רמי בר חמא העלה לראשי צוקין ונפלה אין זה אונס וחייב הא מתה כדרכה הרי זה אונס ופטור ואמאי לימא ליה אוירא דהר קטלה אי נמי אובצנא דהר קטלה
(36b:10)Rami bar Ḥama raises an objection to the opinion of Abaye from a mishna (93b): If one brought the animal to the edge of a cliff and it fell, that is not considered an accident, and he is liable to pay. One may infer that if he brought it to the edge of the cliff and it died in its typical manner, that is considered an accident and he is exempt. But why? Let the owner of the animal say to the bailee: It is the air of the mountain that killed it, or: The exhaustion from climbing the mountain killed it.
(36b:11)הכא במאי עסקינן שהעלה למרעה שמן וטוב אי הכי נפלה נמי שהיה לו לתוקפה ולא תקפה
(36b:11)The Gemara rejects this: With what are we dealing here? It is with a case where the bailee took the animal to a bountiful and high-quality pasture. Since shepherds typically herd their flocks there, taking the animal there is not negligent. The Gemara asks: If so, then the bailee should be exempt even if the animal fell. The Gemara answers: He is liable to pay because he should have subdued the animal to prevent it from falling, and he did not subdue it.
(36b:12)אי הכי אימא רישא עלתה לראשי צוקין ונפלה הרי זה אונס איבעי ליה למיתקפה לא צריכא שתקפתו ועלתה תקפתו וירדה:
(36b:12)The Gemara asks: If so, say the first clause of the mishna: If the animal climbed to the top of a cliff and fell, it is a circumstance beyond his control and he is exempt. Shouldn’t he be liable, since he was required to subdue it and prevent it from falling? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for the tanna to say that the bailee is exempt only in a case where the animal overpowered him and ascended and the animal overpowered him and descended. Although he attempted to prevent the animal from falling, it overpowered the bailee and fell.
(36b:13)אמר רבי יוסי כיצד הלה עושה סחורה בפרתו כו': אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי יוסי אמר ליה רב שמואל בר יהודה לרב יהודה אמרת לן משמיה דשמואל חלוק היה רבי יוסי
(36b:13)§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei said: How does the other party do business with and profit from another’s cow? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said to Rav Yehuda: You told us in the name of Shmuel that Rabbi Yosei was in disagreement with the first tanna
