(3a:1)גזרה שמא יעלה ויתלוש היא גופה גזרה ואנן ניקום ונגזור גזרה לגזרה כולה חדא גזרה היא
(3a:1)It is a decree lest one climb the tree and pick the fruit, as this would constitute the prohibited labor of harvesting. If so, the prohibition against eating fruit is itself due to a decree. And will we arise and issue a decree to prevent violation of another decree? Rav Yosef responded: That is not so; rather, when the Sages issued the initial decree, they enacted the prohibitions against both fruit that fall and a laid egg, as all the prohibitions are components of one decree. In other words, the similar cases of the fruit and the egg were both included in the original decree.
(3a:2)רבי יצחק אמר גזרה משום משקין שזבו
(3a:2)Rabbi Yitzḥak said a different reason: An egg that was laid on a Festival is prohibited as a decree due to liquids that seeped from the fruit (Eiruvin 39b), which is prohibited on that day. The legal status of an egg that was laid on a Festival is like that of liquids that seeped from a fruit on a Festival.
(3a:3)אמר ליה אביי משקין שזבו טעמא מאי גזרה שמא יסחוט היא גופה גזרה ואנן ניקום ונגזור גזרה לגזרה כולה חדא גזרה היא
(3a:3)Abaye said to him: With regard to liquid that seeped from fruit, what is the reason that the Sages prohibited it? It is a decree lest one purposely squeeze the fruit, and thereby perform the prohibited labor of threshing. However, the prohibition against consuming this juice is itself a rabbinic decree. And will we arise and issue a decree to prevent violation of another decree? Rabbi Yitzḥak replied: All the prohibitions are components of one decree. When the Sages prohibited this juice, they banned the eating of an egg laid on a Festival for the same reason, as the actions are similar.
(3a:4)כולהו כרב נחמן לא אמרי כי קושיין כרבה נמי לא אמרי הכנה לית להו
(3a:4)As various explanations have been offered for this mishna, the Gemara seeks to clarify why each Sage was dissatisfied with the other explanations and suggested an alternative. The Gemara says: All of them, Rabba, Rav Yosef, and Rabbi Yitzḥak, did not state their explanations in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman, as stated in our previously stated objection to Rav Naḥman’s explanation. The other Sages also did not state their explanations in accordance with the opinion of Rabba, as they do not accept that there is a Torah prohibition of using items whose preparation was from Shabbat to a Festival or from a Festival to Shabbat.
(3a:5)אלא רב יוסף מאי טעמא לא אמר כרבי יצחק אמר לך ביצה אוכלא ופירות אוכלא לאפוקי משקין דלאו אוכלא
(3a:5)However, the following question arises: Since Rav Yosef provides an explanation that is similar to that of Rabbi Yitzḥak, what is the reason that he did not state his explanation in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak? The Gemara answers that Rav Yosef could have said to you: An egg is food, and fruit is food, i.e., an egg is comparable to fruits that fall. This observation would serve to exclude juice, which is not food but drink. Consequently, an egg is not comparable to juice and would not be included in the same decree.
(3a:6)ורבי יצחק מאי טעמא לא אמר כרב יוסף אמר לך ביצה בלועה ומשקין בלועין לאפוקי פירות דמגלו וקיימו
(3a:6)The Gemara asks the reverse question: And with regard to Rabbi Yitzḥak, what is the reason that he did not state his explanation in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef? The Gemara answers: He could have said to you that the case of an egg is more similar to juices that seep from fruit. How so? An egg is enclosed inside a chicken before it is laid, and likewise juice is enclosed inside the fruit. This observation serves to exclude fruits that fall from a tree, which are standing exposed on the tree. Therefore, the comparison between fruits that fall and an egg is weaker than the comparison between liquid that seeped from fruit and an egg.
(3a:7)ואף רבי יוחנן סבר גזרה משום משקין שזבו דרבי יוחנן רמי דרבי יהודה אדרבי יהודה ומשני
(3a:7)§ The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yoḥanan also holds that the prohibition against eating an egg laid on a Festival is a decree due to liquid that seeped from fruit. What proof can be cited for this? It is proven as Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and a different statement of Rabbi Yehuda, and he resolved the apparent contradiction in a manner that indicates his own opinion.
(3a:8)תנן אין סוחטין את הפירות להוציא מהן משקין ואם יצאו מעצמן אסורין רבי יהודה אומר אם לאוכלין היוצא מהן מותר ואם למשקין היוצא מהן אסור
(3a:8)The Gemara elaborates on the previous statement. We learned in a mishna (Shabbat 143b): One may not squeeze fruits to extract liquids from them on Shabbat, and if the liquids seeped out on their own, it is prohibited to use them on Shabbat, lest he come to squeeze fruits intentionally. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the fruit is designated for eating, e.g., apples, the liquid that seeps from them is permitted. Since there is no concern that one might squeeze the fruit, there is no reason to prohibit its liquid. And if the fruit was originally designated for liquids, such as grapes for wine, there are grounds for concern that one might squeeze them, and therefore the liquid that seeps from them is prohibited.
(3a:9)אלמא כל אוכלין לרבי יהודה אוכלא דאפרת הוא
(3a:9)From the fact that Rabbi Yehuda said that liquid from fruit intended for eating is permitted, one can infer that, apparently, all food that comes out of another food is classified as food that was separated, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Food that was separated is not considered a new food, but part of the food that previously existed.
(3a:10)ורמינהו ועוד אמר רבי יהודה מתנה אדם על כלכלה של פירות ביום טוב ראשון
(3a:10)And the Gemara raises a contradiction against this from a different source: And Rabbi Yehuda said further, concerning untithed fruit, which may not be rendered fit to be eaten on a Festival by separating teruma and tithes from it (Eiruvin 39a): A person may stipulate a condition with regard to a basket of untithed fruit on the first day of a Festival, and say: If today is the true Festival day, the second Festival day is actually a weekday. Therefore, this fruit is permitted, once I separate tithes from it, as on any other weekday. And vice versa: If today is, in fact, a weekday, and tomorrow is the Festival, I hereby separate its tithes today.
(3a:11)ואוכלה בשני וכן ביצה שנולדה בראשון תאכל בשני
(3a:11)Likewise, on the following day, he should again stipulate: If today is a weekday and yesterday was holy, I hereby separate tithes from the fruit now; if today is holy and yesterday was a weekday, separating the tithes yesterday was sufficient. And he may then eat the produce on the second Festival day, as in either case no prohibition is involved. And similarly, an egg laid on the first Festival day may be eaten on the second day, regardless of which day is the actual Festival.
(3a:12)בשני אין בראשון לא ומשני רבי יוחנן מוחלפת השיטה
(3a:12)Rabbi Yehuda’s statement indicates that on the second day, yes, it is permitted to partake of the egg; but if the egg was laid on the first day, no, one may not eat it. If so, Rabbi Yehuda apparently contradicts himself, as he said previously that liquid from food prepared for eating has the same status as the food itself, and that its emergence is considered to be nothing more than the separation of two foods from each other. And Rabbi Yoḥanan resolves the difficulty: The attribution of the opinions with regard to the second day of the Festival is reversed (Berakhot 17b), so that Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion corresponds with his ruling above.
(3a:13)ומדקא מרמי להו אהדדי שמע מינה חד טעמא הוא
(3a:13)The significance of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement for the issue at hand is as follows: Since Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a contradiction between the cases of an egg and liquid that oozed, one may conclude from this that it is the same reason in both cases, i.e., an egg is prohibited on a Festival due to the rabbinic decree against liquid that oozed from fruit.
(3b:1)רבינא אמר לעולם לא תיפוך ורבי יהודה לדבריהם דרבנן קאמר להו
(3b:1)With regard to the contradiction presented by Rabbi Yoḥanan, which led him to suggest that the opinions should be reversed, Ravina said that this is not the only possible resolution: Actually, do not reverse the opinions. Rather, in the case of the two Festival days, one could claim that Rabbi Yehuda spoke to them in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, rather than presenting his own opinion.
(3b:2)לדידי אפילו בראשון נמי שריא דאוכלא דאפרת הוא אלא לדידכו אודו לי מיהת דבשני שריא דשתי קדושות הן ואמרי ליה רבנן לא קדושה אחת היא
(3b:2)If so, Rabbi Yehuda’s statement should be understood as follows: In my opinion, even on the first Festival day, the egg is also permitted, as it is food that was separated. However, according to your opinion, which is that you prohibit liquid that comes from food, at least agree with me that it is permitted on the second day, as they are two sanctities. The first and second days of Rosh HaShana are not one unit, but two separate entities. Therefore, it is possible that the first day is sacred, while the second is a weekday. Consequently, an item prohibited on the first day might be permitted on the second. And the Rabbis said to him: No, the two days are one sanctity, i.e., they are viewed as a single continuous unit. The uncertainty applies equally to both of them.
(3b:3)רבינא בריה דרב עולא אמר הכא בתרנגולת העומדת לגדל ביצים ורבי יהודה לטעמיה דאית ליה מוקצה
(3b:3)Ravina, son of Rav Ulla, said: There is an alternative resolution to the contradiction raised by Rabbi Yoḥanan. Here, in the case of the egg laid on a Festival, Rabbi Yehuda prohibited eating the egg since it is not from a chicken designated for food, whose legal status is that of food. Rather, the case refers to a chicken designated for laying eggs, and Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he holds that there is a prohibition of muktze. Since the egg is produced by something muktze, it is certainly muktze itself, which means that the halakha of food that was separated is inapplicable to this case.
(3b:4)מיתיבי אחד ביצה שנולדה בשבת ואחד ביצה שנולדה ביום טוב אין מטלטלין אותה לא לכסות בה את הכלי ולא לסמוך בה כרעי המטה
(3b:4)§ The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita, which clarifies the issue differently: Both an egg that was laid on Shabbat and an egg that was laid on a Festival are considered to be muktze, and therefore in both cases, one may not move the egg, neither for the sake of food nor for any other purpose: Not to cover a vessel with it, nor to support the legs of a bed with it.
(3b:5)אבל כופה עליה את הכלי בשביל שלא תשבר וספיקא אסורה ואם נתערבה באלף כולן אסורות
(3b:5)However, if one wishes, he may cover the egg with a vessel, without handling the egg itself, so that it does not break from being accidentally trodden upon. Although it is prohibited to move the egg itself, it is nevertheless permitted to move a vessel for its sake. And even if there is uncertainty with regard to whether this egg was laid on a Festival, it is prohibited to move it. And, furthermore, if it became intermingled with a thousand permitted eggs, they are all prohibited.
(3b:6)בשלמא לרבה דאמר משום הכנה הוי ספיקא דאורייתא וכל ספיקא דאורייתא לחומרא
(3b:6)The Gemara notes: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabba, who said that an egg is prohibited due to the lack of preparation, this case involves an uncertainty with regard to the legal status of an item prohibited by Torah law; and in any case of an uncertainty with regard to the legal status of an item prohibited by Torah law, the ruling is stringent. Therefore, the egg is prohibited even if there is uncertainty whether it was laid on a Festival.
(3b:7)אלא לרב יוסף ולרבי יצחק דאמרי משום גזרה ספיקא דרבנן היא וכל ספיקא דרבנן לקולא
(3b:7)However, according to the opinions of Rav Yosef and Rabbi Yitzḥak, who say that an egg is prohibited due to a decree, this case involves an uncertainty with regard to the legal status of an item prohibited by rabbinic law, and in any case of an uncertainty with regard to the legal status of an item prohibited by rabbinic law, the ruling is lenient.
(3b:8)(א"ל) סיפא אתאן לספק טרפה
(3b:8)The Gemara answers: In the latter clause of the baraita, we have arrived at a different case. The case does not involve the prohibition of an egg laid on a Festival; the case involves an egg laid by a chicken with regard to which there is uncertainty whether it is an animal with a condition that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], which is prohibited by Torah law. The uncertainty with regard to the legal status of the chicken is relevant to the egg.
(3b:9)אי הכי אימא סיפא נתערבה באלף כולן אסורות אי אמרת בשלמא ספק יו"ט ספק חול הוי דבר שיש לו מתירין וכל דבר שיש לו מתירין אפילו באלף לא בטיל
(3b:9)The Gemara raises a difficulty with this response: If so, say the latter clause of that same baraita: If it became intermingled with a thousand other eggs, they are all prohibited. Granted, if you say that there is uncertainty whether the egg was laid on a Festival and uncertainty whether it was laid on a weekday, then it is an object whose prohibition is temporary, as the egg will be permitted on the following day, and the principle is: Any object whose prohibition is temporary is not nullified, even by a thousand permitted items. Since its prohibition will lapse on its own, there is no need to make use of the option of nullification.
(3b:10)אלא אי אמרת ספק טרפה דבר שאין לו מתירין היא ותבטל ברובא
(3b:10)However, if you say that the egg referred to in the baraita is an uncertain tereifa, it is an object whose prohibition is not temporary, as there is no way to permit the prohibition of tereifa, and it should therefore be nullified by a simple majority.
(3b:11)וכי תימא ביצה חשובה ולא בטלה הניחא למאן דאמר כל שדרכו לימנות שנינו
(3b:11)The Gemara adds: And if you say that an egg is significant and is not nullified, as nullification applies only to items that have no intrinsic significance, while a significant object cannot be nullified, that works out well according to the one who said that we learned: Any item whose manner is also to be counted, i.e., that is sometimes sold by unit, rather than by weight or volume, is considered significant. An egg falls into that category, as it is sometimes sold by unit.
(3b:12)אלא למאן דאמר את שדרכו לימנות שנינו מאי איכא למימר
(3b:12)However, according to the one who said that we learned: That item whose manner is exclusively to be counted, i.e., that is always sold by unit, is considered significant, what can be said? Although eggs are often sold by unit, they are also often sold by weight or volume.
(3b:13)דתנן מי שהיו לו חבילי תלתן של כלאי הכרם ידלקו נתערבו באחרות ואחרות באחרות כולן ידלקו דברי רבי מאיר וחכמים אומרים יעלו באחת ומאתים
(3b:13)The Gemara cites the mishna where the dispute cited above appears. As we learned (Orla 3:6–7): With regard to one who had bundles of clover, a type of legume, that were diverse kinds of food crops that grew in a vineyard, from which it is prohibited to derive benefit, those bundles must be burned. If the bundles were intermingled with others, and those others were intermingled with others, they must all be burned. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They may be nullified by one part in two hundred similar parts. When the prohibited portion is less than one-half of one percent of the permitted portion, the prohibition is nullified.
(3b:14)שהיה רבי מאיר אומר את שדרכו למנות מקדש וחכמים אומרים אינו מקדש אלא ששה דברים בלבד רבי עקיבא אומר שבעה ואלו הן אגוזי פרך ורמוני באדן וחביות סתומות וחלפי תרדין וקלחי כרוב ודלעת יונית רבי עקיבא מוסיף אף ככרות של בעל הבית
(3b:14)The mishna continues: Rabbi Meir says that they must all be burned, as Rabbi Meir would say: That whose manner is exclusively to be counted, is considered significant and cannot be nullified. Therefore, it renders the entire mixture forbidden, and it must be burned. And the Rabbis say: Only six items are sufficiently significant to render the entire mixture forbidden. Rabbi Akiva says: There are seven. And they are: High-quality nuts from Perekh, and pomegranates from Badan, and sealed barrels of wine, and branches of spinach, and cabbage stalks, and Greek pumpkin. Rabbi Akiva adds: Even loaves of a homeowner.
(3b:15)הראוי לערלה ערלה הראוי לכלאי הכרם כלאי הכרם ואתמר עלה רבי יוחנן אמר את שדרכו למנות שנינו ורבי שמעון בן לקיש אמר כל שדרכו למנות שנינו
(3b:15)Different prohibitions apply to these seven items. That which is fit to be forbidden due to orla, fruit that grows during the first three years after a tree is planted, is forbidden due to orla. That which is fit to be forbidden due to diverse kinds of food crops that grew in a vineyard is forbidden due to diverse kinds in a vineyard (Avoda Zara 74a). And it was stated about the wording of this mishna that there is an amoraic dispute. Rabbi Yoḥanan said that we learned: Only that whose manner is exclusively to be counted is significant and cannot be nullified, and it is therefore prohibited by Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said that we learned: Any item whose manner is also to be counted, is significant and cannot be nullified.
(3b:16)הניחא לרבי שמעון בן לקיש אלא לרבי יוחנן מאי איכא למימר
(3b:16)Returning to the matter of the egg, the Gemara reprises its question: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, but according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, what can be said? Since an egg is not sold exclusively by unit, it is not significant. Therefore, the egg of a tereifa should be nullified by a simple majority.
(3b:17)אמר רב פפא האי תנא תנא דליטרא קציעות הוא דאמר כל דבר שבמנין אפילו בדרבנן לא בטיל וכל שכן בדאורייתא
(3b:17)Rav Pappa said: According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, this tanna, who said that an egg cannot be nullified, is the tanna of the halakha concerning a litra of dried figs, who, based on his statement, said: Any item that is counted, even if it is prohibited by rabbinic law, cannot be nullified, and all the more so items prohibited by Torah law, e.g., the egg of a tereifa.
(3b:18)דתנן ליטרא קציעות שדרסה על פי עגול ואינו יודע באיזה עגול דרסה על פי חבית ואינו יודע באיזו חבית דרסה על פי כורת ואינו יודע באיזו כורת דרסה רבי מאיר אומר רבי אליעזר
(3b:18)As we learned in a mishna: With regard to a litra of dried figs, whose stems were removed, and were dried and pressed in different vessels and shaped into circles, the obligation to tithe fruits is by rabbinic law. If one forgot to tithe the figs, and later remembered that he placed the figs into a barrel, and during the process of producing a circle he pressed the figs onto the mouth of one of the circular vessels in which the circles are formed, and does not know into which circular vessel he pressed it; or, if he recalls that he pressed it on the mouth of a barrel, but does not know in which barrel he pressed it, or if he recalls that he pressed it on the mouth of a straw receptacle, but does not know in which receptacle he pressed it, Rabbi Meir says that in all these cases there is a dispute between the tanna’im of the previous generation: Rabbi Eliezer
