(40a:1)מי שזמן אצלו אורחים לא יוליכו בידם מנות אלא אם כן זכה להם מנותיהם מערב יו"ט:
(40a:1)With regard to one who invited guests to visit him from a town beyond his Shabbat limit, and they joined the Shabbat boundaries to enable them to reach his house, they may not carry in their hands back to their town any portions they received from him as gifts. These portions are as the feet of the host, since they belonged to him on the eve of the Festival. This is true unless he transferred ownership of their portions to them on the eve of the Festival, in which case the gifts may be carried wherever the recipients may walk.
(40a:2)גמ׳ אתמר המפקיד פירות אצל חבירו רב אמר כרגלי מי שהפקידו לו ושמואל אמר כרגלי המפקיד לימא רב ושמואל דאזדו לטעמייהו דתנן אם הכניס ברשות בעל החצר חייב רבי אומר לעולם אינו חייב עד שיקבל עליו בעל הבית לשמור
(40a:2)GEMARA: It is stated that amora’im disagreed with regard to one who deposits produce with another for safekeeping: In whose possession is the produce with regard to determining its place of rest over the Festival? Rav said: They are as the feet of the one with whom they were deposited. And Shmuel said: They are as the feet of the object’s owner. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rav and Shmuel follow their usual line of reasoning, as we learned in a mishna: If one brought in his produce or his ox to another’s courtyard with his permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable for any damage caused to them. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The homeowner is never liable for damages, unless the homeowner explicitly accepts upon himself the responsibility to watch them.
(40a:3)ואמר רב הונא אמר רב הלכה כדברי חכמים ושמואל אמר הלכה כרבי לימא רב דאמר כרבנן ושמואל דאמר כרבי
(40a:3)And Rav Huna said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, who disagreed with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. If so, let us say that Rav spoke here in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, with the following reasoning: Just as when one gives permission to store something in his yard, that object is under his jurisdiction concerning monetary responsibility, so too, it is in his jurisdiction concerning the establishment of the Shabbat limit. And Shmuel spoke here in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: When a homeowner gives permission to store something in his yard, the object is not in his jurisdiction, whether with regard to monetary responsibility or with regard to the Shabbat limit.
(40a:4)אמר לך רב אנא דאמרי אפי' לרבי עד כאן לא קאמר רבי התם אלא דבסתמא לא קביל עליה נטירותא אבל הכא הא קביל עליה נטירותא
(40a:4)The Gemara rejects the comparison: Rav could have said to you: I said my statement in this case even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. For Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi stated his halakha only there, that an object brought into a courtyard is not considered in the possession of the homeowner with regard to monetary responsibility, because in the ordinary situation one who allows someone to bring items into his courtyard does not accept upon himself the responsibility of watching them. But here, the homeowner has accepted upon himself the responsibility of watching the produce, and consequently it is as his feet.
(40a:5)ושמואל אמר אנא דאמרי אפי' לרבנן עד כאן לא קאמרי רבנן התם אלא דניחא ליה לאיניש דניקום תוריה ברשותיה דבעל חצר דאי מזיק ליה לא מיחייב אבל הכא מי ניחא ליה לאיניש דליקום פיריה ברשותיה דחבריה
(40a:5)And similarly, Shmuel could have said: I said my statement here even in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as the Rabbis stated their opinion only there, maintaining that the objects are considered in the jurisdiction of the homeowner, because it is a person’s, i.e., the owner’s, preference that his ox or other object be established in the jurisdiction of the owner of the courtyard, so that if his ox does damage to the homeowner’s property the owner will not be liable. But here, is it a person’s preference for his produce to be in another’s jurisdiction with regard to the establishment of its Shabbat limit? It is certainly inconvenient for him to have his produce out of his Shabbat limit. Consequently, the two disputes between Rav and Shmuel are not necessarily connected.
(40a:6)תנן ואם ערב הוא פירותיו כמוהו ואי אמרת כרגלי מי שהפקידו אצלו כי ערב הוא מאי הוי אמר רב הונא אמרי בי רב כגון שיחד לו קרן זוית
(40a:6)The Gemara asks concerning Rav’s opinion: We learned in the mishna: However, if the owner placed an eiruv, the legal status of his produce is like his status. And if you say that deposited produce is as the feet of the one with whom they were deposited, even if the owner of the produce placed an eiruv, what of it? The produce is under the jurisdiction of the people in the other town with whom it was deposited. It should be as their feet, not as the feet of the owner. Rav Huna said that the Sages of the school of Rav said in reply to this question: The mishna is dealing with a case where the keeper designated a corner of his house for the owner, thereby revealing his intention that the produce not be considered in his own jurisdiction but rather in that of the owner. Consequently, it remains as the feet of the owner.
(40a:7)ת"ש מי שזמן אצלו אורחים לא יוליכו בידם מנות אא"כ זכה להם מנותיהם מערב יו"ט ואי אמרת כרגלי מי שהפקידו אצלו כי זכה להם ע"י אחר מאי הוי ה"נ כיון שזכה להם ע"י אחר כמי שיחד לו קרן זוית דמי
(40a:7)The Gemara raises another challenge to Rav’s opinion: Come and hear a different proof from the mishna: With regard to one who invited guests to visit him, they may not carry in their hands any portions they may have received back to their town, unless he transferred ownership of their portions to them on the eve of the Festival. And if you say that the halakha is that deposited items are as the feet of the one with whom they were deposited, even if he transferred ownership to them by means of another person taking possession on their behalf, what of it? The portions are in any event deposited in the house of the host, and they should be as his feet. The Gemara answers: Here too, since he transferred ownership to them by means of another person, it is considered as a case of one who designated a corner for him, so that the gifts are considered in the jurisdiction of the guests and may be carried wherever they may walk.
(40a:8)ואיבעית אימא זכה שאני
(40a:8)And if you wish, say instead that the entire case of transferring ownership is different because the host’s specific intention is to transfer possession of the portions entirely to his guests. This means that the guests have certainly established the place of rest of these portions in their own jurisdiction and that the portions are as their feet.
(40a:9)רב חנא בר חנילאי תלא בשרא בעברא דדשא אתא לקמיה דרב הונא א"ל אי את תלית זיל שקיל ואי אינהו תלו לך לא תשקול
(40a:9)The Gemara relates: Rav Ḥana bar Ḥanilai once hung meat on the bar of the door of his host’s house, located outside his own town. He subsequently wondered if he was permitted to take the meat home with him, since he had made an eiruv enabling him to walk from his home to his host’s home. He came before Rav Huna to ask his opinion. Rav Huna said to him: If you yourself hung the meat, go take it, but if your hosts hung it for you, you may not take it.
(40a:10)ואי איהו תלא מי שקיל והא רב הונא תלמיד דרב הוה ואמר רב כרגלי מי שהפקידו אצלו שאני עברא דדשא דכמי שיחד לו קרן זוית דמי
(40a:10)The Gemara questions this: And if he himself hung the meat, may he indeed take it? But wasn’t Rav Huna a student of Rav, and Rav said that when an object is deposited in one’s house it is as the feet of the one with whom it was deposited, which in this case is the host. The Gemara responds: Here it is different, as Rav Ḥana bar Ḥanilai hung the meat on the bar of the host’s door, and this case is considered similar to a case of one who designated a corner for him. Since he was given a particular spot for the meat, it is considered his in all respects.
(40a:11)א"ל רב הלל לרב אשי ואי אינהו תלו ליה לא שקיל והאמר שמואל שור של פטם הרי הוא כרגלי כל אדם
(40a:11)The Gemara raises a further objection with regard to this incident: Rav Hillel said to Rav Ashi: And if they hung the meat for him, may he indeed not take it? But didn’t Shmuel say: An ox of a fattener, who fattens oxen in order to sell them for meat, is as the feet of all people, i.e., it is as the feet of whoever buys it on the Festival. This shows that meat that is likely to be sold is not as the feet of its owner, but rather it follows the buyer, as the intention before the Festival is that it be for whoever happens to purchase it. Here too, the intention from the outset was that Rav Ḥana would take it over the course of the Festival.
(40a:12)א"ל רבינא לרב אשי ואי אינהו תלו ליה לא שקיל והאמר רבה בר בר חנה א"ר יוחנן הלכה כר' דוסא א"ל רב אשי לרב כהנא ואי אינהו תלו ליה לא שקיל והתנן הבהמה והכלים כרגלי הבעלים
(40a:12)Furthermore, Ravina said to Rav Ashi: And if the hosts hung the meat for him, may he indeed not take it? But didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, that in a town that has only one shepherd, an animal that will be given to that shepherd over the course of the Festival is as the feet of the shepherd, since it is certain that the animal will be transferred to him. Here too, since the meat was put aside for Rav Ḥana, he should be permitted to take it with him. There is a further difficulty: Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: And if they hung the meat for him, may he indeed not take it? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: The status of animals and vessels is as the feet of their owner? The same should apply to meat that was hung for him; it should be as his feet.
(40a:13)אלא שאני רב חנא בר חנילאי דגברא רבה הוא וטריד בשמעתיה וה"ק ליה אי את תלית אית לך סימנא בגוויה ולא מסחת דעתך מניה זיל שקול ואי אינהו תלו לך מסחת דעתך ולא תשקול:
(40a:13)Because of all these questions, the Gemara reinterprets the case of Rav Ḥana. Rather, the problem with the meat concerns a completely different matter, as the issue under consideration is not the establishment of its place of rest but the prohibition against eating meat that has been left unobserved, due to the concern that it might have been exchanged for prohibited meat. Rav Ḥana bar Ḥanilai is different from the average person, as he is a great man and occupied with his studies, and this is what Rav Huna said to him: If you yourself hung it, in which case you noticed some recognizable mark on the meat and your attention was not diverted from it, the meat is not forbidden for having been left unobserved, and therefore you may go and take it. However, if the hosts hung it for you, you thereby diverted your attention from it, and they too did not pay careful attention to it after hanging it on your behalf. In that case, it is considered meat that has been left unobserved, and you may therefore not take it.
(40a:14)מתני׳ אין משקין ושוחטין את המדבריות אבל משקין ושוחטין את הבייתות אלו הן בייתות הלנות בעיר מדבריות הלנות באפר:
(40a:14)MISHNA: On a Festival one may not water and slaughter desert animals, which graze mainly outside the town, as they are considered muktze. However, one may water and slaughter domestic animals. The mishna elaborates: These are considered domestic animals: Those that sleep in the city at night. Desert animals are those that sleep in the pasture and come into town only rarely.
(40a:15)גמ׳ למה לי למימר משקין ושוחטין מילתא אגב אורחיה קמ"ל דלשקי אינש בהמתו והדר לשחוט משום סרכא דמשכא
(40a:15)GEMARA: The Gemara asks: The mishna is coming to teach which animals are muktze and consequently may not be slaughtered and eaten on the Festival. Why, then, do I need the mishna to say: One may water and slaughter? What does watering have to do with the topic at hand? The Gemara explains: The tanna of the mishna teaches us a practical matter incidentally: That a person should first water his animal and only afterward slaughter it, due to the adhesion of the skin to the meat when this is not done. If one first waters the animal, it is easier to skin it after slaughtering it.
(40a:16)ת"ר אלו הן מדבריות ואלו הן בייתות מדבריות כל שיוצאות בפסח ורועות באפר ונכנסות ברביעה ראשונה ואלו הן בייתות כל שיוצאות ורועות חוץ לתחום ובאות ולנות בתוך התחום רבי אומר אלו ואלו בייתות הן אלא אלו הן מדבריות כל שיוצאות ורועות באפר ואין נכנסות לישוב לא בימות החמה ולא בימות הגשמים
(40a:16)The Sages taught in a baraita: Which are desert animals, and which are domestic ones? Desert animals include all those that go out to pasture at Passover time and graze in the pasture day and night and enter the town again only at the first rainfall, at the start of the rainy season. And these are domestic animals: All that go out in the morning and graze outside the town’s boundary but come and sleep within the boundary at night. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Both these and those are considered domestic animals and may be slaughtered on the Festival. Rather, these are desert animals that may not be slaughtered on the Festival: All those that go out and graze in the pasture and do not enter the settled area, neither in the summer nor in the rainy season.
(40a:17)ומי אית ליה לרבי מוקצה והא בעא מיניה ר' שמעון בר רבי מרבי פצעילי תמרה לר"ש מהו א"ל אין מוקצה לר"ש
(40a:17)The Gemara asks concerning Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion: And does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in general accept the concept of muktze? But didn’t Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, inquire of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Unripe dates that are placed in a basket to ripen until they are edible, what is the halakha according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai? Are they considered muktze or not? He said to him in response: There is no recognition of the halakha of muktze according to Rabbi Shimon,
(40b:1)אלא גרוגרות וצמוקין בלבד
(40b:1)except for the case of dried figs and raisins in the midst of the drying process alone. These are fruits that are fit to be eaten fresh and were deliberately removed from use to allow them to undergo a drying process, during which time they are inedible; they have therefore been actively removed from one’s mind for the interim. Unripe dates, however, are unfit to be eaten fresh and become fit for eating only when they are ripe. Therefore, if one places unripe dates in a basket to ripen, they are never completely removed from his mind, not having been changed from an edible state to an inedible state, and are permitted. If so, desert animals, which are similarly never completely removed from one’s mind, should also not be considered muktze. Why, then, does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi indicate that they have the status of muktze?
(40b:2)The Gemara suggests several resolutions: If you wish, say that these desert animals are also considered similar to dried figs and raisins, as by sending them outside the town the owner has actively removed them from use. And if you wish, say instead that the fact that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi told his son that Rabbi Shimon does not accept the halakha of muktze except for the case of dried figs and raisins does not prove anything about his own opinion; he stated this only in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Shimon, but he himself does not hold accordingly.
(40b:3)ואיבעית אימא לדבריהם דרבנן קאמר להו לדידי אין מוקצה אלא לדידכו אודו לי מיהת היכא דיוצאות ורועות בפסח ונכנסות ברביעה ראשונה דבייתות הן ואמרו ליה רבנן לא מדבריות הן:
(40b:3)And if you wish, say a different answer: He himself, like Rabbi Shimon, did not accept the concept of muktze, and when he spoke in the baraita he was speaking, for the sake of argument, in accordance with the words of the Rabbis who had spoken before him, saying to them, in effect: According to my opinion, there is no halakha of muktze at all, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and all animals may be slaughtered on the Festival. But even according to your approach, that there is a halakha of muktze, agree with me, in any event, that with regard to a case where they go out and graze on Passover and enter again at the first rainfall, they are considered domestic animals and should be permitted. But the Rabbis said to him: No, even those are desert animals.
