(86a:1)אמר ר' אילא ומה אילו אומר לחבירו שדה זו שאני מוכר לך לכשאקחנה ממך תקדיש מי לא קדשה
(86a:1)Rabbi Ila said: And what is the halakha if one person says to another before selling him a field: This field that I am selling to you now, when I will buy it back from you, let it be consecrated? Is the field not consecrated when it is repurchased? In similar fashion, a woman can consecrate her future handiwork, even though the sanctity cannot presently take effect.
(86a:2)מתקיף לה ר' ירמיה מי דמי שדה זו שאני מוכר לך השתא בידיה היא אשה בידה להקדיש מעשה ידיה הא לא דמי אלא לאומר לחבירו שדה זו שמכרתי לך לכשאקחנה ממך תקדיש מי קדשה
(86a:2)Rabbi Yirmeya objects to this comparison: Are the two cases comparable? When a person says: Let this field that I am selling to you now be consecrated when I buy it back from you, now at least the field is still in his possession, and he can therefore consecrate it now, stipulating that the consecration should take effect only when it returns to his ownership. As for the woman, however, is it currently in her power to consecrate her handiwork? At present it does not belong to her. This case is comparable only to that of one who said to another: With regard to this field that I sold to you in the past, when I will buy it back from you, let it be consecrated. In such a case, is the field consecrated when it is repurchased?
(86a:3)מתקיף לה רב פפא מי דמי גבי זבינא פסיקא מילתייהו גבי אשה מי פסיקא מילתא הא לא דמי אלא לאומר לחבירו שדה זו שמשכנתי לך לכשאפדנה ממך תקדיש מי לא קדשה
(86a:3)Rav Pappa objects to this comparison: Are the cases comparable? In the case of the sale of a field, the matter is clear-cut, i.e., it is evident that the field belongs absolutely to its new owner, the buyer. In contrast, in the case of a woman, is the matter clear-cut? Even though the husband has rights to his wife’s handiwork, he does not own her body. Therefore, this case of a woman is comparable only to that of one person who said to another: With regard to this field that I pledged to you, when I will redeem it back from you, let it be consecrated. Here, the owner retains possession of the field itself, but another person enjoys the right to its fruit. In this case, is the field not consecrated when it is redeemed? Here too, a woman retains ownership of her body and she can consecrate her handiwork, stipulating that the consecration should take effect only after she is divorced.
(86a:4)מתקיף לה רב שישא בריה דרב אידי מי דמי שדה בידו לפדותו אשה בידה להתגרש הא לא דמיא אלא לאומר לחבירו שדה זו שמשכנתי לך לעשר שנים לכשאפדנה ממך תקדיש מי לא קדשה
(86a:4)Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, objects to this comparison: Are the cases comparable? In the case of a field, it is in the owner’s power to redeem it immediately by repaying his debt. But as for a woman, is it in her power to be divorced whenever she chooses? Therefore, this case is comparable only to that of one who said to another: With regard to this field that I pledged to you for ten years, when I will redeem it from you, let it be consecrated. In such a case, even though the owner cannot redeem the field for ten years, is it not consecrated once it is redeemed?
(86a:5)מתקיף לה רב אשי מי דמי התם קיץ אשה מי אית לה קיצותא
(86a:5)Rav Ashi objects to this comparison: Are the cases comparable? There, in the case of a field, there is a fixed time frame of ten years. But in the case of a woman, is there a fixed time limit, so that she can know in advance when she will be divorced and released from her husband’s jurisdiction?
(86b:1)אלא אמר רב אשי שאני קונמות דכי קדושת הגוף דמי וכדרבא
(86b:1)Rather, Rav Ashi said that this is the reason Shmuel ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: Although a person cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world, konamot are different. They are stringent and take effect in all cases, as their prohibited status is considered akin to inherent sanctity. When one person prohibits another from deriving benefit from a particular item by means of a konam, the forbidden item is treated as if it has inherent sanctity. It cannot be redeemed and can never become permitted. Because of its severity, a woman can forbid her handiwork to her husband by means of a konam, even though she is obligated to hand over the fruits of her labor to him. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rava.
(86b:2)דאמר רבא הקדש חמץ ושחרור מפקיעין מידי שעבוד
(86b:2)As Rava said: Consecration of an item to the Temple, becoming subject to the prohibition of leavened bread on Passover, and the emancipation of a slave abrogate any lien that exists upon them. The lien on that property does not prevent the consecration, the prohibition of leavened bread, or the emancipation of the slave from taking effect. In all three cases, the debtor loses his ownership of the liened property. The same halakha applies to a konam, whose prohibition has the severity of inherent sanctity. Even though the husband has a right to his wife’s handiwork, which could be described as a lien on her hands, that lien is abrogated when she renders her handiwork forbidden to him by means of a konam, and therefore the vow must be nullified.
(86b:3)אי הכי למה לי שמא יגרשנה תני ועוד שמא יגרשנה
(86b:3)The Gemara asks: If so, why do I need Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s stated reason: Perhaps he will one day divorce her? If the woman’s konam abrogates the husband’s lien, the prohibition should take effect immediately. The Gemara answers: Teach that the vow takes effect right away, which is why the husband must nullify it. And furthermore, adds Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, even if you maintain that the Sages strengthened a husband’s lien so that the vow does not take effect immediately, there is another reason to nullify the vow, as perhaps he will one day divorce her.
(86b:4)מתני׳ נדרה אשתו וסבור שנדרה בתו נדרה בתו וסבור שנדרה אשתו נדרה בנזיר וסבור שנדרה בקרבן נדרה בקרבן וסבור שנדרה בנזיר נדרה מתאנים וסבור שנדרה מן הענבים נדרה מן הענבים וסבור שנדרה מן התאנים הרי זה יחזור ויפר:
(86b:4)MISHNA: If a man’s wife took a vow and he thought that it was his daughter who had taken a vow, or if his daughter took a vow and he thought that it was his wife who had taken a vow, or if his wife vowed to be a nazirite and he thought that she had vowed to bring an offering, or if she vowed to bring an offering and he thought that she had vowed to be a nazirite, or if she took a vow that figs are forbidden to her and he thought that she had taken a vow that grapes are forbidden to her, or if she took a vow that grapes are forbidden to her and he thought that she had taken a vow that figs are forbidden to her, and he nullified any of these vows, in each case, when he realizes his error with regard to the vow, he must repeat the action and nullify the vow a second time.
(86b:5)גמ׳ למימרא דיניא אותה דוקא הוא
(86b:5)GEMARA: With regard to the mishna’s ruling that if a man’s wife took a vow, but he thought that it was his daughter who had taken the vow and he nullified the vow, he must nullify the vow a second time, the Gemara asks: Is this to say that the phrase “But if her husband disallowed her [otah]” (Numbers 30:9) is precise? In other words, does the use of the word her, otah, indicate that a man can nullify a vow only for the specific woman who took it?
