(31a:1)קולר תלוי בצואר עדים תלמוד לומר מדבר שקר תרחק
(31a:1)the chain [kolar] of culpability for the miscarriage of justice be placed around the neck of the false witnesses? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”
(31a:2)The Gemara provides a mnemonic for additional halakhot derived from the verse: “Distance yourself from a false matter.” Three relating to a student; and three relating to creditors; and three relating to a judge: Rags, hears, and explain.
(31a:3)מנין לתלמיד שיושב לפני רבו ורואה זכות לעני וחוב לעשיר מנין שלא ישתוק תלמוד לומר (שמות כג, ז) מדבר שקר תרחק
(31a:3)From where is it derived with regard to a student who is sitting before his teacher and sees a claim that provides advantage for a poor person and disadvantage for a wealthy person that he shall not remain silent? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”
(31a:4)מנין לתלמיד שרואה את רבו שטועה בדין שלא יאמר אמתין לו עד שיגמרנו ואסתרנו ואבננו משלי כדי שיקרא הדין על שמי ת"ל מדבר שקר תרחק
(31a:4)From where is it derived with regard to a student who sees his teacher who is erring in judgment that he shall not say: I will wait for my teacher until he concludes the trial and then I will contradict him and construct a ruling of my own so that the verdict will be attributed to my name? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”
(31a:5)מנין לתלמיד שאמר לו רבו יודע אתה בי שאם נותנין לי מאה מנה איני מבדה מנה יש לי אצל פלוני ואין לי עליו אלא עד אחד מנין שלא יצטרף עמו תלמוד לומר מדבר שקר תרחק
(31a:5)From where is it derived with regard to a student whose teacher said to him: You know concerning me that even if one were to give me one hundred times one hundred dinars, I would not fabricate a claim. Now, I have one hundred dinars in the possession of so-and-so, to whom I lent money, but I have only one witness of the two required to testify about the loan and enable me to collect payment; from where is it derived that the student shall not join with the other witness and testify? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter” (Exodus 23:7).
(31a:6)האי מדבר שקר תרחק נפקא הא ודאי שקורי קא משקר ורחמנא אמר (שמות כ, יב) לא תענה ברעך עד שקר אלא כגון דאמר ליה ודאי חד סהדא אית לי ותא אתה קום התם ולא תימא ולא מידי דהא לא מפקת מפומך שקרא אפי' הכי אסור משום שנאמר מדבר שקר תרחק
(31a:6)The Gemara asks: Is it from the verse “Distance yourself from a false matter” that this matter is derived? But isn’t he certainly lying in that case, and this is already stated, as the Merciful One states: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13)? Rather, the reference is to a case where the teacher said to him: It is certain that I have one witness, and you come and stand there beside him and do not say anything, as in that manner you do not express a lie from your mouth. Your silent presence will create the impression that I have two witnesses and lead the debtor to admit his debt. Even so, it is prohibited to do this, due to that which is stated: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”
(31a:7)מנין לנושה בחבירו מנה שלא יאמר אטעננו במאתים כדי שיודה לי במנה ויתחייב לי שבועה ואגלגל עליו שבועה ממקום אחר תלמוד לומר מדבר שקר תרחק
(31a:7)There are three halakhot with regard to a creditor: From where is it derived with regard to one who is seeking repayment from another of a debt of one hundred dinars, and there are no witnesses to that effect, that he shall not say: I will claim that he owes me two hundred dinars so that he will admit that he owes me one hundred dinars, and he will become liable to take an oath to me, the oath of one who admits to part of a claim, and on that basis I will extend the oath and compel him to take an oath with regard to a debt that he owes me from another place? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”
(31a:8)מנין לנושה בחבירו מנה וטענו מאתים שלא יאמר אכפרנו בב"ד ואודה לו חוץ לבית דין כדי שלא אתחייב לו שבועה ולא יגלגל עלי שבועה ממקום אחר תלמוד לומר מדבר שקר תרחק
(31a:8)From where is it derived with regard to one who is seeking repayment from another of a debt of one hundred dinars and claims that the debtor owes him two hundred dinars, that the debtor shall not say: I will completely deny his claim in court, and I will admit to him outside court so that I will not become liable to take an oath to him and he will not extend the oath and compel me to take an oath with regard to a debt that I owe him from another place? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”
(31a:9)מנין לשלשה שנושין מנה באחד שלא יהא אחד בעל דין ושנים עדים כדי שיוציאו מנה ויחלוקו ת"ל מדבר שקר תרחק
(31a:9)From where is it derived with regard to three who are seeking repayment from one individual for a total of one hundred dinars, that one of the three should not assume the role of a sole litigant and claim one hundred dinars, and the other two will assume the role of witnesses so that they will exact payment of one hundred dinars from the debtor and divide it among them? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”
(31a:10)מנין לשנים שבאו לדין אחד לבוש סמרטוטין ואחד לבוש איצטלית בת מאה מנה שאומרין לו לבוש כמותו או הלבישהו כמותך ת"ל מדבר שקר תרחק כי הוו אתו לקמיה דרבא בר רב הונא אמר להו שלופו פוזמוקייכו וחותו לדינא
(31a:10)There are three halakhot with regard to a judge: From where is it derived with regard to two individuals who came to judgment, one dressed in rags and one dressed in a garment worth one hundred times one hundred dinars, that the judges say to the wealthy person: Dress like the poor person or dress the poor person in a garment like yours? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.” The Gemara relates: When individuals would come before Rava bar Rav Huna for judgment he would say to them: Remove your fine shoes [puzmukaikhu] and descend for judgment, so you will not appear more distinguished than the other litigant.
(31a:11)מנין לדיין שלא ישמע דברי בעל דין (חבירו) קודם שיבא בעל דין חבירו ת"ל מדבר שקר תרחק
(31a:11)From where is it derived that a judge should not hear the statement of one litigant before the other litigant comes to court? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”
(31a:12)מנין לבעל דין שלא יטעים דבריו לדיין קודם שיבא בעל דין חבירו ת"ל מדבר שקר תרחק רב כהנא מתני (שמות כ, ז) מלא תשא לא תשיא
(31a:12)From where is it derived that a litigant shall not explain the rationale behind his statements to the judge before the other litigant comes to court? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.” Rav Kahana teaches that this halakha is derived from that which is written: “You shall not accept [lo tissa] a false report” (Exodus 23:1), which he interprets as though it is written: You shall not cause others [lo tassi] to accept a false report.
(31a:13)(יחזקאל יח, יח) ואשר לא טוב עשה בתוך עמיו רב אמר זה הבא בהרשאה ושמואל אמר זה הלוקח שדה שיש עליה עסיקין:
(31a:13)The verse states: “And did that which is not good among his people” (Ezekiel 18:18). Rav says: This is referring to one who comes to court with authorization to present claims on behalf of another. And Shmuel says: This is referring to one who purchases a field concerning which there are those who contest ownership of it, as in that way, he involves himself in the disputes of others.
(31a:14)אינה נוהגת אלא בראוין להעיד כו': לאפוקי מאי אמר רב פפא לאפוקי מלך ורב אחא בר יעקב אמר לאפוקי משחק בקוביא
(31a:14)§ The mishna teaches that the oath of testimony is practiced only with regard to those fit to testify. The Gemara asks: This statement serves to exclude what person not allowed to testify who was not mentioned explicitly in the mishna? Rav Pappa said: It serves to exclude a king who, although he is neither a relative nor otherwise disqualified from testifying, does not testify in court. And Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: It serves to exclude one who plays with dice, who is disqualified as a witness by rabbinic law.
(31a:15)מ"ד משחק בקוביא כל שכן מלך ומ"ד מלך אבל משחק בקוביא מדאורייתא מחזא חזי ורבנן הוא דפסלוהו:
(31a:15)The Gemara notes: According to the one who says that the mishna excludes one who plays with dice from the oath of testimony, all the more so should a king be excluded, as he does not testify by Torah law. And according to the one who says that the mishna excludes a king from the oath of testimony, it may exclude only a king, but perhaps one who plays with dice is not excluded, as by Torah law he is fit to testify and it is the Sages who disqualified him. Therefore, he is not excluded from the oath of testimony, which is by Torah law.
(31a:16)בפני בית דין ושלא בפני ב"ד כו': במאי קמיפלגי
(31a:16)§ The mishna teaches: The oath of testimony is practiced both in the presence of the court and not in the presence of the court, when the potential witness takes the oath on his own. And if the oath is administered by others he is liable only when he denies, in court, any knowledge of the incident in question. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Whether the witness takes the oath on his own or whether the oath is administered by others, he is liable only when he denies, in court, any knowledge of the incident in question. The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree?
(31a:17)אמרוה רבנן קמיה דרב פפא בדון מינה ומינה בדון מינה ואוקי באתרה קא מיפלגי
(31a:17)The Sages said the explanation before Rav Pappa: They disagree with regard to the method of derivation by means of a verbal analogy. Is the method to infer the halakha from the source of the verbal analogy and derive the details from that source as well, or is the method to infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place?
(31a:18)ר' מאיר סבר דון מינה ומינה מפקדון מה פקדון מושבע מפי עצמו חייב אף עדות מושבע מפי עצמו חייב ומינה מה פקדון בין בבית דין ובין שלא בבית דין אף עדות בין בבית דין ובין שלא בבית דין
(31a:18)The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Meir holds: Infer from it and derive the details from it. The halakha of the oath of testimony is derived from the halakha of an oath on a deposit: Just as in the case of the oath on a deposit, one who takes the oath on his own is liable, so too in the case of the oath of testimony, one who takes the oath on his own is liable. And derive the details from it: Just as in the case of the oath on a deposit one is liable whether he took the oath in court or he took the oath not in court, so too in the case of the oath of testimony, one is liable whether he took the oath in court or he took the oath not in court.
(31a:19)ורבנן סברי דון מינה ואוקי באתרה מה פקדון מושבע מפי עצמו חייב אף עדות מושבע מפי עצמו חייב ואוקי באתרה מה מושבע מפי אחרים בבית דין אין שלא בבית דין לא אף מושבע מפי עצמו בבית דין אין שלא בבית דין לא
(31a:19)And the Rabbis hold: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place. The halakha of the oath of testimony is derived from the halakha of an oath on a deposit: Just as in the case of the oath on a deposit, one who takes the oath on his own is liable, so too in the case of the oath of testimony, one who takes the oath on his own is liable. But interpret the halakha according to its own place and derive the details of the halakha from the halakhot of the oath of testimony: Just as in the case of one who was administered an oath by others, if he denies knowledge of the matter in court, yes, he is liable, and if his denial does not take place in court, no, he is not liable; so too, one who took the oath on his own, if he did so in court, yes, he is liable, and if he did not take the oath in court, no, he is not liable.
(31b:1)אמר להו רב פפא אי מפקדון גמרי לה רבנן דכולי עלמא לא פליגי דדון מינה ומינה
(31b:1)Rav Pappa said to the Rabbis: If the Rabbis derive liability for one who takes a false oath of testimony on his own by means of a verbal analogy from the oath on a deposit, then everyone agrees: Infer from it and derive the details from it, and even the Rabbis would concede that all of the halakhot of the oath of testimony are derived from the oath on a deposit; therefore, one is liable for an oath taken on one’s own even outside the court.
(31b:2)אלא היינו טעמא דרבנן דמייתו לה בקל וחומר ומה מפי אחרים חייב מפי עצמו לא כל שכן
(31b:2)Rather, this is the reason that the Rabbis hold that there is no liability for the oath of testimony taken on one’s own outside the court: They derive it by means of an a fortiori inference from the halakhot of the oath of testimony itself, as follows: And if one who was administered an oath by others is liable, when one takes the oath on his own, is he not all the more so liable?
(31b:3)ומדמייתו לה מקל וחומר דיו לבא מן הדין להיות כנדון מה מושבע מפי אחרים בב"ד אין שלא בב"ד לא אף מושבע מפי עצמו בפני ב"ד אין שלא בפני ב"ד לא
(31b:3)And from the fact that they derived the halakha by means of an a fortiori inference, one is bound by the limitations that restrict that derivation: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. Therefore, just as one who is administered an oath by others, if the oath is administered in court, yes, he is liable, and if it is not administered in court, no, he is not liable, so too, one who took the oath on his own, before a court, yes, he is liable, and if it is not before a court, no, he is not liable.
(31b:4)אמרו ליה רבנן לרב פפא מי מצית אמרת דלאו בדון מינה ומינה פליגי והתנן גבי פקדון שבועת הפקדון נוהגת באנשים ובנשים ברחוקין ובקרובין בכשרין ובפסולין בפני ב"ד ושלא בפני ב"ד מפי עצמו ומפי אחרים אינו חייב עד שיכפור בו בב"ד דברי ר"מ וחכ"א בין מפי עצמו ובין מפי אחרים כיון שכפר בו חייב
(31b:4)The Rabbis said to Rav Pappa: How can you say that it is not with regard to the matter of: Infer from it and derive the details from it, that they disagree? But didn’t we learn in the mishna with regard to the oath on a deposit: The oath on a deposit is practiced with regard to men and with regard to women, with regard to non-relatives and with regard to relatives, with regard to those fit to testify and with regard to those unfit to testify. The oath on a deposit is practiced both in the presence of the court and not in the presence of the court, when the bailee takes the oath on his own. And if the oath is administered by others, he is not liable until he denies responsibility for the deposit in court. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Whether the bailee takes the oath on his own or whether the oath is administered by others, once he denied the claim concerning the deposit he is liable.
(31b:5)מושבע מפי אחרים בפקדון מנא להו לרבנן דחייב לאו דגמרי לה מעדות ושמע מינה בדון מינה ומינה פליגי
(31b:5)The question arises: From where do the Rabbis derive that one who is administered an oath on a deposit by others is liable, given that an oath of that kind is not mentioned in the Torah in the context of an oath on a deposit? Is it not that they derive it from the halakhot of the oath of testimony? And conclude from it that it is with regard to the matter of: Infer from it and derive the details from it, that they disagree? The Rabbis hold: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place. The fact that one is liable for an oath on a deposit that is administered by others is derived from the oath of testimony, but one does not derive that one is liable only if that oath is administered in the presence of a court. Rather, the oath on a deposit administered by others is derived from an oath on a deposit taken on one’s own; one is liable in both cases for an oath taken not in the presence of the court.
(31b:6)מההיא אין מהא ליכא למשמע מינה:
(31b:6)Rav Pappa said to the Rabbis: From that mishna, yes, it is evident that the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir disagree with regard to the matter of: Infer from it and derive the details from it. However, no inference is to be learned from this mishna taught with regard to the oath of testimony, as perhaps the Rabbis derived their opinion by means of an a fortiori inference.
(31b:7)וחייבין על זדון השבועה: מנהני מילי דתנו רבנן בכולן נאמר בהן ונעלם וכאן לא נאמר בה ונעלם לחייב על המזיד כשוגג:
(31b:7)§ The mishna teaches: And one is liable for the act of taking a false oath with intent. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for taking a false oath of testimony with intent? It is derived as the Sages taught: In all of the other cases where one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering (see Leviticus 5:2–4), i.e., the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, and violating an oath on an utterance, it is stated: “And it is hidden”; but here, with regard to the oath of testimony, it is not stated: And it is hidden, which serves to render one liable for taking the oath intentionally just as he is liable for taking the oath unwittingly.
(31b:8)ועל שגגתה עם זדון העדות: ה"ד שגגתה עם זדון העדות א"ר יהודה אמר רב באומר יודע אני ששבועה זו אסורה אבל איני יודע אם חייבין עליה קרבן אם לא:
(31b:8)§ The mishna teaches: And one is liable for an unwitting act of taking a false oath provided that he takes the oath with intent in terms of the testimony. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the case of an unwitting act of taking a false oath with intent in terms of the testimony? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says that this is in the case of one who says: I know that taking this false oath that I do not know the relevant information is prohibited, but I do not know whether or not one is liable to bring an offering for taking that oath.
(31b:9)The mishna teaches: But they are not liable for taking the oath if they were unwitting in terms of the testimony alone. If one actually forgot that he knows about the matter, he is exempt from bringing an offering. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that we learn in the mishna that which Rav said in response to the dispute of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi? The Gemara (26a) cited a dispute between Rav Kahana and Rav Asi with regard to a certain statement of Rav, and each took an oath that his version was accurate. Rav told them that although the version of one of the amora’im was not accurate, he is not liable for taking a false oath, as each amora was convinced that his oath was true. This is not an unwitting oath; rather, it is an oath taken unaware.
(31b:10)לא אע"ג דתנן איצטריך ס"ד אמינא הכא הוא דלא כתיב ונעלם דבעינן שוגג דומיא דמזיד אבל התם דכתיב ונעלם אפילו שגגתה כל דהו קמ"ל:
(31b:10)The Gemara responds: No, even though we learned this halakha in the mishna, Rav’s statement that the one who did not cite Rav’s statement accurately is exempt was necessary. It may enter your mind to say: It is only here, with regard to the oath of testimony, that one is exempt for unwittingly taking a false oath, as: And it is hidden, is not written concerning it, indicating that in order to be liable, we require that the halakhic status of the unwitting oath is similar to that of an intentional oath, i.e., he knows that he is taking a false oath, but he does not know that he is liable to bring an offering for doing so. Therefore, one who is unaware that it is a false oath is exempt. But there, in the case of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi, where each took an oath on an utterance, where it is written: “And it is hidden,” even if it is entirely unwitting, i.e., they were totally unaware that the oath was false, one might say that he is liable. Therefore, Rav teaches us that even in the case of an oath on an utterance, one who is unwitting to that extent is exempt.
(31b:11)מתני׳ שבועת העדות כיצד אמר לשנים בואו והעידוני שבועה שאין אנו יודעין לך עדות או שאמרו לו אין אנו יודעין לך עדות משביע אני עליכם ואמרו אמן הרי אלו חייבין
(31b:11)MISHNA: Liability to bring a sliding-scale offering for taking a false oath of testimony, how so? In a case where the plaintiff said to two individuals: Come and testify on my behalf, and they replied: On our oath we do not know any testimony on your behalf, i.e., we do not have any knowledge of the matter you speak of, or in a case where they said to him: We do not know any testimony on your behalf, and he said to them: I administer an oath to you, and they said: Amen; if it was determined that they lied, these two witnesses are liable.
(31b:12)השביע עליהם חמש פעמים חוץ לב"ד ובאו לב"ד והודו פטורין כפרו חייבין על כל אחת ואחת השביע עליהן ה' פעמים בפני ב"ד וכפרו אינן חייבין אלא אחת אר"ש מה טעם הואיל ואינם יכולין לחזור ולהודות
(31b:12)If he administered an oath to them five times outside the court, and they came to court and admitted that they had knowledge of the incident in question and testified, they are exempt. But if they denied knowledge of the incident in court as well, they are liable for each and every one of the oaths administered to them outside the court. If he administered an oath to them five times before the court, and they denied knowledge of the incident, they are liable for taking only one false oath. Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason for this ruling? Since once they denied that they had any knowledge of the incident they can no longer retract that denial and admit that they have knowledge of the matter. Therefore, there was only one oath of testimony, and there is no liability for the remaining oaths.
(31b:13)כפרו שניהן כאחד שניהן חייבין בזה אחר זה הראשון חייב והשני פטור כפר אחד והודה אחד הכופר חייב
(31b:13)If both of the witnesses denied knowledge of the incident together, both of them are liable. If they denied knowledge one after the other, the first who denied knowledge is liable, and the second is exempt, as once the first witness denies knowledge of the incident, the second is an individual witness, whose testimony is not decisive. If one of the two witnesses denied knowledge of the incident, and the other one admitted that he had knowledge and proceeded to testify, the one who denies knowledge of the incident is liable.
(31b:14)היו שתי כיתי עדים כפרה הראשונה ואח"כ כפרה השניה שתיהן חייבות מפני שהעדות יכולה להתקיים בשתיהן:
(31b:14)If there were two sets of witnesses that took the oath of testimony, and the first set denied knowledge of the matter and then the second set denied knowledge of the matter, both of the sets are liable, because the testimony can exist with either of them, as even after the first set denies knowledge of the incident, the second remains capable of providing decisive testimony.
(31b:15)גמ׳ אמר שמואל ראוהו שרץ אחריהן אמרו לו מה אתה רץ אחרינו שבועה שאין אנו יודעין לך עדות פטורין עד שישמעו מפיו מאי קא משמע לן תנינא שילח ביד עבדו או שאמר להן הנתבע משביע אני עליכם שאם אתם יודעין לו עדות שתבואו ותעידוהו הרי אלו פטורים
(31b:15)GEMARA: Shmuel says: If the witnesses saw the plaintiff pursuing them, and they said to him: For what reason are you pursuing us? On our oath we do not know any testimony on your behalf, they are exempt, until they will hear a demand to testify directly from his mouth. The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us? We learn this in a mishna (35a): If the plaintiff sent a request for testimony with his servant, or if the respondent said to the potential witnesses: I administer an oath to you that if you know any testimony on behalf of the plaintiff, i.e., my opponent in the litigation, you will come and testify on his behalf, and they took a false oath that they have no knowledge of the incident, they are exempt,
